


Hate Speech in the Media Landscape of Crimea

Information and Analytical Report



HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA

AN INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT ON THE SPREAD OF HATE SPEECH ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CRIMEAN PENINSULA (MARCH 2014 — JULY 2017)

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This publication presents the outcome of documenting and classifying facts on the use of hate speech on the territory of the occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and city of Sevastopol from April 2014 to July 2017.

This publication uses material from mass media that have been disseminated in the territory of Crimea since the occupation of the peninsula by the Russian Federation, as well as information from open sources, including information resources from the authorities of Ukraine, Russian Federation and Crimean de-facto authorities, Crimean Human Rights Group and Human Rights Information Centre.

This publication is intended for the representatives of state authorities, educational and research institutions, diplomatic missions, international, non-governmental and human rights organizations

Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG) — is an organization of Crimean human rights defenders and journalists aimed at promoting the observance and protection of human rights in Crimea by documenting the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law on the territory of the Crimean peninsula as well as attracting wide attention to these issues and searching for methods and elaborating instruments to defend human rights in Crimea. The CHRG team is composed of experts, human rights defenders and journalists from various countries who have been participating in monitoring and documenting the violations of human rights in Crimea since February 2014. The CHRG maintains a major focus on the human rights violations resulting from the unlawful actions of the Russian Federation in Crimea. The findings of the CHRG monitoring and documenting of human rights violations are presented in monthly monitoring reviews on the human rights situation in Crimea¹, as well as in the issue-related CHRG reports and articles².

Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC) — is a Ukrainian non-governmental organization which aims at promoting human rights, rule of law, and the ideas of civil society in Ukraine. Since March 2014, together with the Russian and Crimean human rights defenders, the organization has been taking part in the operation of the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission (CFM) – the only international human rights civic initiative that has been acting in Crimea on a continual basis. Once in the so-called 'patriotic stop-list' of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, the CFM had to cease working in Crimea for its monitors were at risk of prosecution. The HRIC continues monitoring the situation regarding freedom of speech and expression in Crimea, as well as supporting local journalists and human rights defenders. The organization is involved in awareness-raising and research activities and advocates the human rights issues in Crimea at the national and international level.

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Human Rights Information Centre, 2018

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¹ Monitoring reviews are available at: <u>http://crimeahrg.org/category/monitor</u>

² Issue-related reports and articles are available at: <u>http://crimeahrg.org/category/analytic</u>

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BAF	Armed Forces
VCIOM	Russian Public Opinion Research Center
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
AOC	Administrative Offences Code
CJE	Commission on Journalism Ethics
CHRG	Crimean Human Rights Group
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
UN	United Nations
RC	'Republic of Crimea'
RF	Russian Federation
HRRC	Human Rights Resource Center
СС	Criminal Code
UOC-KP	Ukrainian Orthodox ChurchKyiv Patriarchate
UHHRU	Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union
HRIC	Human Rights Information Centre

FOREWORD

Since the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014, the situation with freedom of speech and expression has dramatically changed for the worse on the peninsula.

On-air broadcasting of Ukrainian TV channels and radio stations on the peninsula's territory stopped at the very beginning of the occupation. Dozens of Crimean journalists and editorial departments had to leave the peninsula and move to mainland Ukraine, while some editorial offices closed down as they could not reregister and continue working under the Russian laws, and a lot of journalists retired from business in fear of persecution.

Pursuant to Freedom House's estimates, the degree of media freedom in Crimea in 2014 became one of the lowest in the world. The organization's report¹ gave the peninsula 94 points out of 100 (the worst score possible), so Crimea made the 'worst of the worst' territories list with Russia's score being 83.

The overwhelming majority of Crimean mass media which left the occupied peninsula and went on with their activity in mainland Ukraine remains blocked out in Crimea just like the main Ukraine-wide media.

Thus, according to data from the Human Rights Information Centre and Crimean Human Rights Group, the web-sites of 30 mass media are still completely or partially blocked on the territory of Crimea as of the beginning of March 2018². These include the websites of information agencies highlighting Crimean events: Crimea. Realities, Center of Journalistic Investigations, Blackseanews.net, 15 Minutes, QHA, Crimea. SOS, Events of Crimea, Sevastopol Meridian, as well as Ukrainian-wide information and analytical publications: Ukrayinska Pravda, European Pravda, Hromadske Radio, UAinfo, Sled.net.ua, Glavnoe.ua Observer, RBC-Ukraine, Ukrinform, DePo, Gordon, Information Resistance, Focus, Censor.net. Furthermore, the web-sites of such TV channels as Chernomorskaya TV and Radio Company, ATR, Novyi Kanal, ICTV, 5 kanal, Espreso TV, UA: First and STB³ have also been blocked.

The editorial departments of Ukrainian mass media cannot act in Crimea legally. The journalists of Ukrainian periodicals, even those who moved to mainland Ukraine and those working in Crimea covertly, are subjected to harsh persecution⁴, including criminal prosecution⁵.

The population of Crimea receives most of its information from Russian publications and TV channels, as well as from the Crimean mass media that showed loyalty to

- ⁴ Human Rights Defenders Claim About the Sweeping Purge of the Media in Crimea / Human Rights Information Centre, April 09, 2015 — <u>https://goo.gl/gGG3ti</u>
- ⁵ Ukrainian Journalists Demand that the Russian Federation Should Cease Criminal Proceedings Against Their Colleges / Crimean Human Rights Group, October 27, 2016 — <u>https://goo.gl/xZQKkE</u>

¹ See Freedom of the Press 2017 / Freedom House — URL: <u>https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTP_2017_book-let_FINAL_April28.pdf</u>

² The check was performed on March 1-3, 2018 in Simferopol, Sevastopol, Bilohirsk, Yalta and Kerch. The resources to be checked were selected given the earlier statements about the mass media blocking, as well as by means of random checks of television

channels and the most popular Ukrainian information and analytical web-sites.

³ It should be noted that a part of these online media is blocked by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) — completely or partially (for instance, Hromadske Radio, 15 Minutes, Censor. net, RBC, Sled.net.ua etc.), while others cannot be accessed on the territory of Crimea without any legal justification. The majority of the abovementioned mass media is not blocked on the territory of the Russian Federation.



the occupation authorities and, therefore, were allowed to

work in Crimea openly.

With this in mind, hate speech manifestations in the media landscape of Crimea were monitored on the websites of the Crimean mass media whose editorial offices are located on the peninsula's territory, on the sites of the so-called 'authorities' of Crimea, and on the air of the top-rated television channels of the Russian Federation broadcasting on the peninsula.

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe defines *hate speech* as the idea covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin⁶.

It is worth noting that the problem of hate speech use in the media scene of Crimea had existed long before the peninsula was occupied by Russia. There were occasional hate-speech-related scandals and conflicts in the region.

However, since the beginning of the occupation, hate speech has been used in propaganda on an unprecedented scale with hate rhetoric becoming increasingly aggressive. It was already in February 2014 that the pro-Russian mass media started calling Ukrainians **fascists** and **blood-thirsty Banderites**⁷. Billboards with messages about 'Ukrainian fascism' began to appear on the streets of Crimean cities, while public transport showed videos calling on Crimeans to stand up to the 'Banderites.'

Such statements have a rather wide range of use and target mainly those Ukrainians who do not abide by the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation. Since the armed conflict between the RF and Ukraine started, these notions became much more common, just like the mass accusations of Ukrainians of 'fascism' and submission to the 'fascist junta' that had allegedly seized the power in the country. Such deliberately misleading epithets were used to describe various social groups of Ukrainians: volunteers, civic activists, journalists, Euromaidan participants and supporters, population of Western Ukraine, Ukrainian-speaking citizens in general, advocates of the European integration of Ukraine and others. A wide use of the abovementioned terms in various contexts and projections created the general association and image of a Ukrainian that incites hatred and fear.

Hate speech as an element of RF government propaganda has become a real weapon intended to create a long-term negative image of the enemy and mobilize its active supporters of the seizure of Crimea. It yielded the desired results — the Russian-leaning part of population became radicalized fast and came down on the side of

⁶ Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 'Hate Speech' adopted on October 30, 1997 — <u>https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/Display-</u> DCTMContent?documentId=0900001680505d5b

⁷ Members or supporters of Stepan Bandera's political movement who was a Ukrainian political activist and a leader of the nationalist and independence movement of Ukraine.

INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT



Funeral of Crimean Tatar Activist Reshat Ametov Who Became a Victim of Torture and Extralegal Execution, March 2014, Crimea

the Russian invaders. People with the opposite views were beaten up, kidnapped and tortured. Such violence was triggered by the Ukrainian language or the Flag of the Crimean Tatar people.

Thus, Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar activist who initiated a one-man protest against the occupation of Crimea, was kidnapped by the 'Crimean Self-Defense' members on the central square of Simferopol on March 03, 2014. His body was found on March 15 with numerous marks of torture, his head bound with duct-tape, a pair of handcuffs beside him. The cause of death — a knife stab in the eye.

Two months later, the hate-filled Crimeans went to war in the Ukrainian Donbass and later in Syria.

The intensity of hate speech use in the media landscape of Crimea started gradually fading away as time passed. At the same time, hate speech is still rather common: it is used by the representatives of Crimean 'authorities,' politicians, local journalists and pro-Russian activists. Hate rhetoric peaks during high-profile events, mostly related to the armed conflict in Donbass as well as the activities of the Crimean Tatar national movement.

The authors of this research set out to document, systematize and demonstrate the scales of hate speech use in Crimea (using several time periods as an example for comparison) as well as reveal the main tendencies and ways of rousing hatred amid the ongoing international armed conflict on this territory.

We hope that the documented facts of hate speech use will be subject to a proper legal evaluation at both national and international levels, become the evidence base in various legal proceedings and will be used to ramp up international pressure on Russia as an occupant.

METHODOLOGY

The monitoring of hate speech use in the media landscape of Crimea has been carried out by the monitors and experts of the Crimean Human Rights Group and the Human Rights Information Centre pursuant to a set methodology based on the approaches of the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis⁸ (Russian Federation) as well as those of the Without Limits project of the Social Action Center⁹ (Ukraine) with some modifications.

Definition of Hate Speech

Despite the fact that hate speech is widespread in many areas of public and private life, there is no one common definition of what *hate speech* means exactly (*for more detail see Section: Overview of Hate Speech Laws*).

Many definitions of *hate speech* are based on establishing the fact of the incitement to hatred, humiliation or discrimination on certain grounds in statements, with the citation of such grounds, which makes such definitions simple and practical.

For this reason the basic definition for the purpose of this research is the definition used by the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis¹⁰ with small changes:

'Hate speech is any inappropriate statements about ethnic, confessional or other social groups or communities, or separate persons who represent such communities.'

Object of Monitoring

We chose the sources to be monitored among those that broadcast on the Crimean peninsula after its occupation by the Russian Federation¹¹, including the web-sites of the main Crimean 'authorities,' top-rated Crimean mass media with editorial offices located on the territory of Crimea as well as major Russian TV channels broadcasting in the media landscape of Crimea.

In particular, the objects of monitoring are as follows:

Web-sites of Crimean 'Authorities'

- 1. 'Government of the Republic of Crimea'¹²
- 2. 'State Council of the Republic of Crimea'¹³
- 3. 'Government of Sevastopol'14
- 4. 'Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol'¹⁵

- ¹² Web-site of the 'Government of the Republic of Crimea.' Available at: <u>http://rk.gov.ru/</u>
- ¹³ Web-site of the 'State Council of the Republic of Crimea.' Available at: <u>http://crimea.gov.ru/</u>
- ¹⁴ Web-site of the 'Government of Sevastopol.' Available at: <u>https://sevastopol.gov.ru</u>
- ¹⁵ Web-site of the 'Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol.' Available at: <u>https://sevzakon.ru/</u>

⁸ See Hate Speech against Society: (Collection of Articles) / compiled by: A. Verkhovsky. –

Moscow: Sova Center, 2007. — 259 p.: tables. (Scientific (Use Academic in place of Scientific) Publication)

⁹ See Without Limits project of the Social Action Center: Hate Speech and Mass Media: International Standards and Approaches. Kyiv, 2015.

¹⁰ See, for instance: H. Kozhevnikova. Hate Speech: Typology of Journalist's Mistakes // Applied Conflictology for Journalists. Moscow, 2006. p. 95; H. Kozhevnikova. Applied Religious Studies for Journalists. Moscow: 'Human Rights,' 2009. p.48.

¹¹ We did not monitor Crimean mass media that moved out of the peninsula after its occupation by the Russian Federation and continue working in mainland Ukraine (e.g. ATR channel, QHA information agency, Center of Journalistic Investigations and others) as these mass media are blocked in Crimea.

- 5. 'Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Crimea'¹⁶
- 6. 'Prosecutor's Office of Sevastopol City'¹⁷
- 7. 'Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea'¹⁸
- 'Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Sevastopol¹⁹

Crimean Mass Media

Web-sites of TV channels:

- 9. First Crimean²⁰
- 10. NTS Sevastopol²¹

Web-sites of newspapers:

- 11. Krymskaya Pravda [Crimean Truth]²²
- 12. Slava Sevastopolia [Glory of Sevastopol]²³
- 13. Krymskiye Izvestia [Crimean News]²⁴

Online media:

- 14. Crimeainform²⁵
- 15. RIA Crimea²⁶
- 16. ForPost Sevastopol²⁷

It is worth noting that Pervyi Krymskiy TV channel and Krymskaya Pravda newspaper are funded from the budget of the Republic of Crimea, and Krymskaya Pravda is virtually controlled by the family of Konstantin Bakharev, the State Duma Deputy from the Republic of Crimea (his father Mikhail Bakharev is the editor-in-chief). The web-site of RIA Crimea is a unit of the Russian governmental news agency Rossiya Segodnya, while ForPost Sevastopol belongs to Sergey Kazhanov, the 'Deputy of the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol.'

Web-Sites of Russian TV Channels Broadcasting in Crimea

We monitored the newscasts along with information and analytical programs aired at night (prime time) on

- ¹⁹ Web-site of the 'Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Sevastopol.' Available at: <u>https://92.xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/</u>
- ²⁰ Web-site of First Crimean. Available at: <u>http://ltvcrimea.ru/</u>
- ²¹ Web-site of NTS Sevastopol. Available at: <u>http://nts-tv.com/</u>
- ²² Web-site of Krymskaya Pravda. «Available at: <u>http://c-pravda.ru/</u>
- ²³ Web-site of Slava Sevastopolia. Available at: <u>https://slavasev.ru/</u>
- ²⁴ Web-site of Krymskiye Izvestia. Available at: http://crimiz.ru/
- ²⁵ Web-site of Crimeainform. Available at: <u>http://www.c-inform.info/</u>
- ²⁶ Web-site of RIA Crimea. Available at: <u>http://crimea.ria.ru/</u>
- ²⁷ Web-site of ForPost Sevastopol. Available at: <u>http://sevastopol.su/</u>

three top-rated Russian TV channels broadcasting on the Crimean peninsula.

- 17. Russia-128
- 18. NTV²⁹
- 19. Channel One³⁰

The monitoring established that the main examples of hate speech in news programs of the abovementioned channels are present in the form of oral statements of news presenters, journalists or speakers in news editions whose transcriptions are not publicly available. Such news items are posted on the web-sites of TV companies as videos³¹.

Period of Monitoring

The monitoring covers the period from March 2014 to July 2017.

To show the dynamics of hate speech use on the mentioned media resources, we carried out a detailed monitoring, studying all newscasts and materials during two periods: from March 01, 2014 to September 31, 2014 and from January 01, 2017 to July 31, 2017.

We searched using key words applied to different vulnerable and discriminated-against groups *(see the list of key words below)* the list of which was compiled at the pilot stage of monitoring according to the results of a preliminary study of various Crimean and Russian information web-sites (those of authorities and mass media). The search was performed through the search box of websites and Google filters (by specific sites) using key words.

Furthermore, the monitors involved in the study watched all evening newscasts on three TV channels (Russia-1, NTV, Channel One) broadcasting in Crimea for six months: March, April and May 2014 and March, April and May 2017, as the main examples of hate speech exist in the form of oral statements of news presenters, journalists

¹⁶ Web-site of the 'Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Crimea.' Available at: <u>http://www.rkproc.ru/</u>

¹⁷ Web-site of the 'Prosecutor's Office of Sevastopol City.' Available at: <u>http://www.sevproc.ru/</u>

¹⁸ Web-site of the 'Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea.' Available at: <u>https://82.xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/</u>

²⁸ 'Vesti' newscasts aired on weekdays at 8 P.M. (Moscow time) and 'Vesti Nedeli' weekly newscasts aired on Sunday at 8 P.M. (Moscow time). We monitored the Russia-1 web-site (available at: <u>https://russia.tv/</u>) and 'Vesti' web-site (available at: <u>https://www. vesti.ru/</u>) where these news items were posted.

²⁹ 'Segonia' newscasts aired on weekdays at 7 P.M. (Moscow time). 'Central Television' and 'Summing up the Week with Irada Zeynalova' news programs aired on weekends at 7 P.M. (Moscow time). We monitored the NTV web-site where these news items were posted (available at: <u>http://www.ntv.ru/</u>).

³⁰ 'Vremya' newscasts aired every day except Sunday at 9 P.M. (Moscow time). 'Sunday Vremya' newscasts aired on Sundays at 9 P.M. (Moscow time). We monitored the Channel One website where these news items were posted (available at: <u>https:// www.ltv.ru/</u>).

³¹ The monitors involved in the study watched all evening newscasts on three TV channels for six months: March, April and May 2014 and March, April and May 2017.

or speakers in news items, and the transcriptions of television programs are not publicly available.

Despite the fact that this method does not show the whole picture of how widely hate speech is spread in the media landscape of Crimea, it is efficient for processing a vast amount of text material.

Key Words

The study demonstrated that hate speech in relation to social and ethnical / national groups of people was expressed on the web-sites of the mass media and 'authorities' of Crimea with the use of the following negatively connoted lexemes:

Ukrainians³²:

Banderites (Translator's Note: members or supporters of Stepan Bandera's political movement], Bandar-logs, militants, extremist elements, our little brothers [literal*ly; this phrase in Russian denotes pets*] **'wolves in sheep's** clothing,' redneck Nazis, Galician Nazis [Galicia is a historical region in Central-Eastern Europe which now lies within western Ukraine], Galicians, Westerners, Western Nazis, punishers, Kyiv terrorists, crypto-Banderites, common fence-sitters, Ukies [short and derogative for 'Ukrainians'], Ukiecitizens, Ukiegentlemen, puppets of the West, naziocrats, the conscious and pseudo-educated, national extremists, Nazi junta, Nazi punitive squads, Nazi punishers, Nazis, savages, neonats [short for 'neonationalists'], neofascist threat, Hitlerites' henchmen, radical nationalists, Hitler's henchmen, the conscious [used in a derogatory sense], douchebagulators [derogative for 'regulators'], trident-headed, gang, Ukrainian arias, Ukranazians, Ukes [another variant of 'Ukies'], Ukienazi, ultranationalists, racists, fascist scum, Little Russians [the Russian Empire gave Ukraine a colonial name Little Russia in 18th century], neonazis, Shukhevych's followers [Roman Shukhevych was a Ukrainian politician and military leader], Nazi collaborators, traitors, Nazi henchman, Russophobes, ultras, extremists

Crimean Tatars:

Jihadists, punishers, Crimean Tatar radicals, radical Islamists, Russophobes, extremists

Euromaidan supporters:

Euromaidananas, Kyiv travelling circus, Heroes of Banderite Labor [derogative for 'Heroes of Socialist Labor,' an honorary title of the Soviet Union given for exceptional achievements in economy and culture], maidanuts, maidanshchyky [literally 'con artists'], maidan-brained, extremist imposters, anti-Semites

Members and supporters of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People:

rabble rousers, mujahideen, bandits, fifth column

Muslims:

Islamists, Tatar Wahhabis

Members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church — Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP):

dissenters

Members of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC):

Uniates

Journalists and human rights defenders:

grant-eaters

Migrants:

gastarbeiters [from German — 'migrant workers']

Jehovah's Witnesses:

sectarians

The study revealed the use of Ukrainian words in Russian texts in a derogatory context with regard to Ukraine and people living in it, for instance 'ненька' [nenka, literally 'mother,' short for 'motherland'), незалежна [TN: nezalezhna, literally 'independent'], 'цеевропа' [TN: tseyevropa, literally 'is Europe' — short for 'Ukraine is Europe'].

We also registered the following descriptions of Ukraine (with the projection on all its citizens): Ukrojunta, bloody junta, cannibalistic junta, fascist junta.

Ukrainians' actions and initiatives are described with the following words:

vyshyvanka-dressed hysterics [vyshyvanka is a traditional Ukrainian embroidered shirt], blue and yellow chew, nazification, Banderization, Ukiecrap, Banderite asswipe, Ukiehouse, rushnyk and vyshyvanka nuthouse [rushnyk is a Ukrainian ritual embroidered cloth], undividedcountrism, Ukrainian totalitarianism, fascism, nationalism, terror.

It should be noted that when monitoring and assessing the consequences of hate speech use, it is important to take into account the ongoing international armed conflict³³ on the territory of Ukraine with regard to the

³² Ukrainians in different contexts figure as ethnic and political subjects. In a number of cases, the line between Ukrainians as ethnic community and Ukrainians as civic community is blurred. Although in general it is allowed to criticize political subjects (citizens of Ukraine) but the authors noticed that occasionally citizenship (just like ethnicity) was also used to stir up hostility amid the international armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

³³ The Crimean events are qualified as an international armed conflict within the meaning of UN Resolution 71/205 as of December 19, 2016 and UN Resolution 72/190 as of December 19, 2017 on the

occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. Under such circumstances, stirring up hatred promotes the continuation of the conflict or even its escalation.

If we consider such lexicon in the context of the international armed conflict between the RF and Ukraine, we may see the tendency of creating an image of an enemy and kindling hatred towards Ukrainians as an ethnic and civic community,³⁴ especially together with the false accusations of Nazism³⁵ and constant comparison of Ukrainians with the Nazi criminals of World War II. In the context of the armed conflict, such words as **Nazis**, **junta**, **punishers**, **Banderites** and **fascists** in relation to Ukrainians should be regarded as the expressions used as part of the general policy to incite hatred and create an image of an enemy as well as present Ukrainians as the followers of the Nazi criminals of the Second World War.

The mass use of the expressions characterizing Ukraine as a junta-occupied country and its citizens as Nazis toeing the line of such junta allows the monitors to conclude that such appraisals go beyond the limits of criticism acceptable in a free democratic state and exemplify hate speech.

Types of Hate Speech

To evaluate the specific manifestations of hate speech by its potential negative impact and severity of possible

- ³⁴ Such accusations and descriptions of Ukrainians as 'Nazis,' 'junta' etc., which are used to incite hatred, carry the consequences for the ethnic community of Ukrainians in general as well, because in many cases studied afterwards, it is impossible to say for sure whether the civic or ethnic community of Ukrainians was the object of hate speech use.
- ³⁵ In particular, the monitoring revealed different variants of false accusations of Ukrainians of Nazism and fascism projecting on the whole nation, although the legislation of Ukraine condemns the communistic and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and prohibits the propaganda of their symbols, establishment and operation of political parties if their program goals or actions are intended to promote war, rouse interethnic, racial or religious hatred or advocate the communistic and/or national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes. Furthermore, the share of the Ukrainian population supporting the nationalist political parties is relatively small: during the parliamentary elections in 2014, only 4.7% of electorate voted for the Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union, and 1.8% for the Right Sector party, and this level of support of such parties is significantly lower than that in other countries.

consequences, we used the classification of the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis (Russian Federation)³⁶.

In particular, the study classified hate speech by the following types.

- 1. Harsh hate speech:
- calls for violence (in relation to a specific situation with the object of violence indicated; claiming violence to be acceptable in articles, messages of the mass media and so on, as well as in the form of direct calls for violence towards a certain social group);
- direct incitement to discrimination, including in the form of general slogans;
- covert calls for violence and discrimination (propaganda of 'positive,' historical or modern examples of violence or discrimination; expressions like '*lt would be a* good idea to make...,' '*lt is high time*...' etc.);
- calls for not letting a certain ethnic or religious group be established in a region (district, city etc.), for instance, arguing the point that it is inadmissible to build a mosque in an 'Orthodox city.'
- 2. Medium hate speech:
- justifying the historical cases of violence and discrimination (expressions like 'Turks killed Armenians in self-defense in 1915');
- publications and statements that question generally acknowledged historical facts of violence and discrimination (for instance, diminishing the scale of Holocaust or saying that 'Crimean Tatars were exiled because they took Hitler's side');
- statements about the historical crimes of a certain ethnic or religious group as such (things like 'They always resorted to violence only,' 'They always conspired against us');
- statements about the criminal nature of a certain ethnic or religious group (for instance, 'They are all thieves');
- reflections on the disproportionate preference given to a certain ethnic or religious group in financial terms, or to a representative office in authorities, media etc.;
- accusations of a certain ethnic, religious or social group of producing a negative impact on society and the state ('dilution of national identity,' 'erosion of traditional values' etc.);

situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as the Action Report Based on Preliminary Investigation (2016) of the Prosecutor's Office of the International Criminal Court that established that the situation in the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol equals to an international armed conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. This international armed conflict started no later than February 26, 2014 when the Russian Federation deployed its military personnel to gain control of the parts of Ukraine's territory without the Ukrainian government's consent. The law on international armed conflicts is applicable to the period since March 18, 2014 to the extent the situation in the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol equals to an ongoing occupation.

³⁶ See, for instance: H. Kozhevnikova. Hate Speech after Kondopoga Events — in the Collection of Articles: A. Verkhovsky (editor). Hate Speech against Society. Moscow: Sova Center, 2007. p.12-13.

- pointing out the connection of a certain social group with political and government bodies to discriminate it;
- accusing a group of attempts to seize power or territorial expansion (literally, unlike calling for not letting it be established in the region);
- disclaiming the citizenship (that is mentioning citizens as foreigners depending on their ethnic identification).
- 3. Soft hate speech:
- creating a negative image of an ethnic, religious or social group (not specific event-related accusations, but conveyed in a wider sense with the help of time periods, general content or intonation of a text or text fragment);
- mentioning an ethnic, religious or social group or its members in a humiliating or insulting context

(as well as in crime news or simply mentioning an ethnonym);

- statements about the inferiority (lack of culture, intellectual abilities, incapacity for creative work) of a certain ethnic, religious or social group as such (something like 'Street cleaning is their only trade');
- statements about the moral flaws of a certain ethnic or religious group ('The Jews are greedy,' 'The Gypsies are deceitful' — this type should be distinguished from the statements about cultural or intellectual inferiority);
- citing explicitly xenophobic statements and texts without the commentary that defines the line between an interviewee and an interviewer; similarly — providing space in a newspaper for clearly xenophobic propaganda without editorial commentary or other sort of controversy.

OVERVIEW OF HATE SPEECH LAWS

Both Ukraine which Crimea belongs to and the Russian Federation that occupied the Crimean peninsula are members of such international organizations such as the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe. A range of the norms of international laws and national legislations of both countries contain direct and indirect references intended to prevent hate speech from spreading.

DEFINITION OF HATE SPEECH IN INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS

Despite the fact that hate speech is widespread in many spheres of public and private life, and there are a lot of discussions about the possibility or impossibility to legislatively regulate and prohibit it, as of today, there is no one common definition of what all parties to the discussion mean by *hate speech*.

There is no uniform standard of this term in Ukrainian either: sometimes *hate speech* is translated as мова ворожнечі, sometimes as мова ненависті, and other times even differently.

You may find several common definitions of the *hate speech* phenomenon in international practice below.

Paragraph 2, Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights³⁷ (adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) as of December 16, 1966) stipulates that any advocacy or national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination³⁸ (adopted by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) as of December 21, 1965) provides for the following:

'States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia:

a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof;

b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda

³⁷ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Available at: <u>http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/pactpol.shtml</u>

³⁸ International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Available at: <u>http://www.un.org/ru/documents/</u> <u>decl_conv/conventions/raceconv.shtml</u>

activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;

c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.'

Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 'Hate Speech'³⁹ interprets this term as the notion '...covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.'

Furthermore, in the context of this study, we should take into consideration Principle 1 of the abovementioned Recommendation:

'The governments of the member states, public authorities and public institutions at the national, regional and local levels, as well as officials, have a special responsibility to refrain from statements, in particular to the media, which may reasonably be understood as hate speech, or as speech likely to produce the effect of legitimising, spreading or promoting racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of discrimination or hatred based on intolerance. Such statements should be prohibited and publicly disavowed whenever they occur.'

There are seven principles set forth in the Recommendation that define the basic rules and obligations of the member states of the Council of Europe to combat hate speech, inter alia, they stipulate that it is necessary to take into account when hate speech is disseminated through the media. For instance, Principle 6 says that:

"...national law and practice should distinguish clearly between the responsibility of the author of expressions of hate speech, on the one hand, and any responsibility of the media and media professionals contributing to their dissemination as part of their mission to communicate information and ideas on matters of public interest on the other hand."

Another international document that should be mentioned in the context of combating hate speech is the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems (Strasbourg, January 28, 2003)⁴⁰.

Pursuant to article 2 of this Protocol, racist and xenophobic material means 'any written material, any image or any other representation of ideas or theories, which advocates, promotes or incites hatred, discrimination or violence, against any individual or group of individuals, based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion if used as a pretext for any of these factors.'

Furthermore, articles 3-7 of this Protocol describe in detail the governments' obligations with regard to the criminalization of acts aimed at disseminating racist and xenophobic materials through computer systems.

The OSCE's recommendations⁴¹ contain the following definition: 'Forms of expression that are motivated by, demonstrate or encourage hostility towards a group — or a person because of their membership of that group — are commonly referred to as 'hate speech.'

PRACTICE OF EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS REGARDS HATE SPEECH

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has considered a fairly large number of cases concerning the freedom of speech in the context of hate speech use and dissemination.

...Tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society. That being so, as a matter of principle it may be considered necessary in certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance ..., provided that any 'formalities,' 'conditions,' 'restrictions' or 'penalties' imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued,' the ECHR believes⁴².

At the same time, the Court finds that 'Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of

³⁹ Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 'Hate Speech.' Available at: <u>http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_093</u>

⁴⁰ Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. Available at: <u>http://zakon2. rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_687</u>

⁴¹ Preventing and responding to hate crimes. A resource guide for NGOs in the OSCE region. Available at: http://www.osce.org/uk/ node/180336?download=true

⁴² Erbakan v. Turkey judgment of December 6, 2006, § 56.

[a democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 [of the European Convention on Human Rights], it is applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 'democratic society'⁴³.

The balance between the need to ensure freedom of speech and, at the same time, prevent the dissemination and entrenchment of hate speech has been established by the European Court of Human Rights in the following cases⁴⁴.

Antisemitism, Islamophobia and Other Forms of 'Ideological' Intolerance

Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (February 20, 2007): the applicant, the owner and editor of a newspaper, was convicted for 'public incitement to hatred' in his article about ZOG⁴⁵.

Garaudy v. France (June 24, 2003): the book entitled *The Founding Myths of Modern Israel* denied Holocaust.

Norwood v. United Kingdom (November 16, 2004): the applicant had displayed in his window a poster supplied by the British National Party representing the Twin Towers in flame with the words 'Islam out of Britain — Protect the British People!'

Leroy v. France (October 2, 2008): the cartoonist was convicted for publicly condoning terrorism following the publication in a Basque weekly newspaper of a drawing representing the attack on the Twin Towers with a slogan 'We all dreamt of it... Hamas did it!'

Gündüz v. Turkey (November 13, 2003): the self-proclaimed leader of an Islamist sect was sentenced to a long-term imprisonment for saying that 'Every child born in a secular marriage is a bastard' during a televised debate broadcast.

Soulas and others v. France (June 10, 2008): the applicants were convicted for publishing the book entitled *The Colonisation of Europe: Truthful Remarks About Immigration and Islam.*

Racism, Migrantophobia

Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands (October 11, 1979): the applicant — the president of a political party claiming that 'Holland is for Dutchmen' was convicted for possessing leaflets addressed to 'White Dutch people' and calling on 'white people' to take over in order to exile from the country 'hundreds of thousands of Surinamers, Turks and other undesired aliens...'

Jersild v. Denmark (September 23, 1994): the applicant, a journalist, was convicted for making a documentary about the ultra-right youth which openly expressed the abusive and derogatory remarks about immigrants and ethnic groups.

Homophobia

Vejdeland and others v. Sweden (February 9, 2012): the applicant was convicted for distributing in an upper secondary school approximately 100 leaflets saying that homosexuality was a 'deviant sexual proclivity,' had 'amorally destructive effect on the substance of society' and was 'responsible for the development of HIV and AIDS.'

It is also worth noting that all the standards set forth by the ECHR in its judgments are an inherent part of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and obligatory for every member state of the Council of Europe. Moreover, in most countries, the international laws are higher in the legislative hierarchy than the national laws. And the international regulations must be applied in case of discrepancies. Russia is not an exception in this case.

The ECHR's position with regard to hate speech is highlighted in more detail in Issue No. 4 of *Crimea Beyond Limits*, a thematic review by the Regional Centre for Human Rights and the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union⁴⁶.

HATE SPEECH LAWS IN UKRAINE

The legal framework for combating hate speech is laid in the **Constitution of Ukraine** (articles 15, 21 and 24):

'Social life in Ukraine shall be based on the principles of political, economic and ideological diversity. No ideology shall be recognized as mandatory by the State⁴⁷.

⁴³ Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine judgment of March 29, 2005, §.40.

⁴⁴ Here you may find the list of the most interesting examples of this court's judgments classified by certain types of hate speech.

⁴⁵ ZOG stands for Zionist occupation government. In the anti-Semite discourse, this abbreviation is used in some versions of the Jewish conspiracy.

⁴⁶ Crimea Beyond Rules, Issue No. 4. Thematic review of the human rights situation under occupation. Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union 2018. <u>https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/4Kr_Ru_fin_18.12.2017.pdf</u>

⁴⁷ Article 15 of the Constitution of Ukraine.

- All people shall be free and equal in their dignity and rights. Human rights and freedoms shall be inalienable and inviolable⁴⁸.

- Citizens shall have equal constitutional rights and freedoms and shall be equal before the law. There shall be no privileges or restrictions based on race, skin colour, political, religious and other beliefs, gender, ethnic and social origin, wealth status, place of residence, linguistic or other characteristics⁴⁹.

As we pointed out earlier, the international laws and regulations define hate speech as one of the forms of discrimination. In 2012, Ukraine approved the Law of Ukraine on Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination⁵⁰.

In accordance with article 1, clause 1, paragraph 2 thereof, **discrimination** is a 'situation where an individual and/or group of individuals because of their race, skin color, political, religious or other beliefs, sex, age, disability, ethnic or social origin, nationality, property and marital status, place of residence, linguistic or other characteristics that existed, exist and may be real or assumed (hereinafter — certain characteristics), is limited in any form in recognition, exercise or use of their rights and freedoms established by this Law except when such limitation has a legal, objectively reasonable goal achieved in a proper manner.'

In addition, this law defines the term **incitement to discrimination** — 'directions, instructions or calls for discrimination against an individual and/or group of individuals on any grounds.'

As regards the mass media, we should take into account the following norms of effective legislation which may be referred to the combating of hate speech.

- Print media in Ukraine shall not be used for propaganda of war, violence and cruelty; incitement of ethnic, national and religious hatred⁵¹.
- Court shall terminate the print publication if paragraph 1 of article 3 hereof is violated (if the abovementioned restriction is applicable)⁵².
- It shall be prohibited to use broadcasting organizations to agitate for launching a war or aggressive actions or promote the idea of such, and/or incite to

national, racial or religious hatred; to promote the idea of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of persons on the grounds of their religious beliefs, ideology, national or ethnic affiliation, physical or wealth status or social origin⁵³.

The National Council may bring action seeking revocation of the broadcast license, where it is found that orders to eliminate violations of the legislation and license requirements have not been complied with⁵⁴.

Furthermore, the persons disseminating hate speech may be criminally indicted.

Article 161 of the **Criminal Code of Ukraine** *Violation* of Citizens' Equality Based on Their Race, Nationality, Religious Preferences, Disability or on Other Grounds provides for the following:

Willful actions inciting national, racial or religious enmity and hatred, humiliation of national honor and dignity, or the insult of citizens' feelings in respect to their religious convictions, and also any direct or indirect restriction of rights, or granting direct or indirect privileges to citizens based on race, skin color, political, religious and other convictions, sex, disability, ethnic and social origin, wealth status, place of residence, linguistic or other characteristics shall be punishable by a fine of 200 to 500 tax-free minimum incomes, or deprivation of liberty for up to five years with or without the deprivation of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to three years.'

Article 300 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine Import, Creation or Distribution of Works Promoting Violence and Cruelty, Racial, National or Religious Intolerance and Discrimination stipulates the following:

'Import into Ukraine for sale or distribution purposes, or creation, storage, transportation or other movement for the same purposes, or sale or distribution of works that promote violence and cruelty, racial, national or religious intolerance and discrimination, and also compelling others to participate in creation of such works shall be punishable by a fine up to 150 tax-free minimum incomes, or arrest for up to six months, or deprivation of liberty for up to three years.'

⁴⁸ Article 21 of the Constitution of Ukraine.

⁴⁹ Article 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine.

⁵⁰ Law of Ukraine on Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination. Available at <u>http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/</u> <u>show/5207-17</u>

⁵¹ Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine on Print Media (Press) in Ukraine.

⁵² Article 18 of the Law of Ukraine on Print Media (Press) in Ukraine.

⁵³ Article 6, clause 2 of the Law of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting.

⁵⁴ Article 37, clause 5 of the Law of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting.

HATE SPEECH LAWS IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The Constitution of the Russian Federation recognizes ideological diversity. No ideology may be established as state or obligatory one. Political diversity and multi-party system is recognized in the Russian Federation. Public associations are equal before the law. The creation and activities of public associations whose purposes and actions are aimed at a forced change of the fundamental principles of the constitutional system and at violating the integrity of the Russian Federation, undermining its security, setting up armed units and instigating social, racial, national and religious strife is prohibited⁵⁵.

Moreover, the RF Constitution provides for the following:

All people shall be equal before the law and court. The State shall guarantee the equality of rights and freedoms of man and citizen, regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property and official status, place of residence, religion, convictions, membership of public associations, and also of other circumstances. All forms of limitations of human rights on social, racial, national, linguistic or religious grounds shall be banned. Man and woman shall enjoy equal rights and freedoms and have equal possibilities to exercise them⁵⁶.

Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of ideas and speech. The propaganda or agitation instigating social, racial, national or religious hatred and strife shall not be allowed. The propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic supremacy shall be banned. No one may be forced to express their views and convictions or to reject them⁵⁷.

The Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations contains the following norms⁵⁸. Freedom of conscience and freedom of religious profession, including the right to profess individually or corporately with other persons any religion or not to profess any, and to choose and change freely, and to hold and disseminate religious and other convictions and to act in accordance with them, as well as by creating religious associations, are guaranteed within the Russian Federation. Creation of privileges, restrictions, or any form of discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation is not permit-

ted. Citizens of the Russian federation are equal before the law in all areas of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural life irrespective of religious affiliation and religious adherence. Citizens of the Russian Federation whose convictions or religious profession preclude performance of military service have the right to substitute alternative civic service for it. No one is obliged to provide information about personal religious affiliation, nor can be subjected to duress for determining religious affiliation or confession or rejection of religious confession, or for participation or nonparticipation in religious services, or other religious rites and ceremonies or the activity of religious associations or religious education. Enticement of minors into religious associations is forbidden, as well as the teaching of religion to minors against their will and without the consent of their parents or guardians. Prohibition of the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of conscience and freedom of religious profession, including actions accompanied by violence against the individual, intentional offense to the sentiment of citizens with regard to their religious affiliation, propaganda of religious superiority, destruction or alienation of property or threat thereof, is prohibited and is prosecuted in accordance with federal law. The conduct of public ceremonies and the distribution of texts and illustrations that offend religious sentiments of citizens in the vicinity of objects of religious veneration are prohibited.

The Law of the Russian Federation on Mass Media, which is common for all types of media, dictates the following⁵⁹:

- No provision shall be made for the use of mass media for purposes of committing criminally indictable deeds, divulging information making up a state secret or any other law-protective secret, disseminating materials containing the public calls for terrorism or publicly condoning terrorism, other extremist materials, including those promoting pornography, violence and cruelty.
- It shall be prohibited to use the journalist's right to disseminate information with an aim of defaming a citizen or certain categories of citizens solely on account of sex, age, race or nationality, language, religious beliefs, profession, place of residence and employment, as well as political convictions⁶⁰.

The Federal Law on Countering Extremist Activity widely used in the Russian Federation defines the notion of extremist activity (extremist)⁶¹ and provides for the procedure of closing mass media, religious or non-governmental organizations if any of its norms are violated. Very general and ambiguous definitions are often used by the authorities to prosecute alternative points of view

⁵⁵ Article 13 of the RF Constitution.

⁵⁶ Article 19 of the RF Constitution.

⁵⁷ Article 29 of the RF Constitution.

⁵⁸ Article 3 of the Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.

 $^{^{\}rm 59}$ Article 4 of the Law of the Russian Federation on Mass Media.

⁶⁰ Article 51 of the Law of the Russian Federation on Mass Media.

⁶¹ Article 1 of the Federal Law on Countering Extremist Activity.

rather than to combat hate speech. Thus, according to the Human Rights Information Centre, in Crimea, during four years of occupation, this law had been mostly applied for the purposes of politically motivated prosecutions.

Hate-speech-related criminal liability is provided for by the following norms of the **Criminal Code of the Russian Federation:**

- Incitement to hatred and strife (Article 282 of the RF CC);
- Calls for extremist activity (Article 280 of the RF CC) and separatism (Article 280.1 of the RF CC);
- Condoning terrorism (Article 205.2 of the RF CC);
- Nazism rehabilitation (Article 354.1 of the RF CC);
- Offending the feelings of religious believers (Article 148, clause 1 of the RF CC);
- Participation in a criminal community (Article 282.1 of the RF CC) or organization (Article 282.2 of the RF CC).

Furthermore, there are several articles of the Administrative Offences Code of the Russian Federation concerning hate speech:

- Dissemination of 'extremist materials' (Article 20.29 of the RF AOC);
- Displaying prohibited symbols (Article 20.3 of the RF AOC).

ETHICAL STANDARDS OF JOURNALISM AS REGARDS HATE SPEECH

Besides the legislation, hate speech is prohibited by the professional ethical standards of journalism.

'The journalist shall be aware of the danger of discrimination being furthered by the media, and shall do the utmost to avoid facilitating such discrimination based on, among other things, race, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinions, and national or social origins⁶²,' states the IFJ Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of Journalists adopted at the World Congress of the International Federation of Journalists in Bordeaux on April 25-28, 1954.

Similar norms and requirements may be seen at the national level in professional standards regulating the activity of mass media in both Ukraine and Russia.

Thus, the Ethics Code of Ukrainian Journalists dictates:

'No one may be discriminated against because of gender, language, race, religion or ethnic, social origin or political preferences. This information may be pointed out only if it is a necessary part of the story⁶³.'

The observance of this code in Ukraine is monitored by the Commission on Journalism Ethics⁶⁴ which considers the ethical and professional conflicts arising between journalists or between journalists and the society with regard to the journalistic activity. The Commission regulates the work of journalists and editorial teams and allows them to offer the ways of solving conflicts based on the unified professional standard: the Ethics Code of Ukrainian Journalists. Its main purpose is to promote the observance of professional ethics standards by Ukrainian mass media and the formation of the public request for high quality journalism.

The Russian Federation has similar standards. For example, the Code of Professional Conduct of the Russian Journalist says the following:

'A journalist is fully aware of the danger of restrictions, harassment and violence, which can be provoked by their work. In carrying out their professional duties, a journalist opposes extremism and restriction of civil rights on any grounds, including gender, race, language, religion, political or other opinion, as well as social and national origin. A journalist respects the honor and dignity of the people who become the objects of their professional attention. They refrain from any derogatory allusions or comments regarding race, ethnicity, color, religion, social origin or gender, as well as in relation to a physical disability or illness of a person. They refrain from publishing such information, except in cases when these circumstances are directly related to the content of the published article. A journalist is unconditionally obliged to avoid offensive expressions which may harm the moral and physical health of people⁶⁵.'

The observance of this code in Russia is monitored by the Public Board on Press Complaints⁶⁶. It is an independent civil society organization regulating and co-regulating the activity of mass media. The Board considers the complaints of the audience of mass media about the violations of the journalist's professional ethics and media ethics. The first and foremost task of the Board is to resolve specific media disputes extrajudicially.

⁶² Clause 7 of the IFJ Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of Journalists / adopted at the World Congress of the International Federation of Journalists in Bordeaux on April 25-28, 1954.

⁶³ Clause 15 of the Ethics Code of Ukrainian Journalists.

⁶⁴ Commission's web-site: http://cje.org.ua

⁶⁵ Clause 5 of the Code of Professional Conduct of the Russian Journalist.

⁶⁶ Board's web-site: http://www.presscouncil.ru/

OUTCOMES OF HATE SPEECH MONITORING IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA


HATE SPEECH IN ACTIVITY OF CRIMEAN OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES

Hate speech in the media landscape of Crimea shows itself in different ways. In addition to a constant use of clichés inciting hatred in various mass media, such expressions are published on the official web-sites of the Crimean occupation authorities. The monitoring revealed a wide range of the tendencies of stirring up hatred on such resources.

We registered different types of soft hate speech on the web-sties of the Crimean 'authorities' under study *(see* the detailed list of web-sites in the Methodology section). Thus, the soft form of hate speech was used in 59 out of 71 cases, medium form — in 12, harsh one — in one. The largest number of the examples of incitement of hatred is on the web-site of the 'Government of the Republic of Crimea.'

For instance, the 'Government of Crimea' published the article titled *Ukrainian Nazism Became the Basis of State Ideology of Ukraine — Sergey Aksyonov* in the News section of its web-site in June 2017, let us cite it:

'Today these demons in human shape, these executioners who shed the blood of thousands of people — not only that of Poles, but also that of Belarusians, Jews, Russians, Ukrainians — have



Distribution of Hate Speech between Web-Sites of 'State Authorities' of Crimea

become the heroes of modern Ukraine. Their ideological followers **are spilling blood all over Donbass, killing** and sending dissentients to prison, declaring blockades, **committing acts of terrorism** against the population of Crimea⁶⁷.'

This publication projects the Nazi crimes of World War II on the citizens of Ukraine who are rhetorically linked to a generally denounced object.

The web-site also contains other similar expressions of Crimean politicians who are regularly quoted in the form of interviews or news items.

Furthermore, there are also PDF-versions of several Crimean budget-funded print media on the web-site.

The statements with hate speech published in Slava Trudu and Selskiy Truzhenik sociopolitical newspapers are available in PDF on the web-site of the Crimean 'government.'

For example, Slava Trudu newspaper mentioned the nationalities and ethnic origin of people in the context of crime news:

'There were few actual Crimean Tatars among those in the Asker's camp, but there were plenty of individuals with the strange past from here and there, including Islamists of Arab origin. They were likely to be **preparing provocations** and the **story with saboteurs** wasn't probably supposed to be the last one⁶⁸.'

The Selskiy Truzhenik newspaper called Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists who participated in the protest against the occupation of Crimea by the Crimean parliament building on February 26, 2014 putschists, Mejlists [TN: members of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People which was outlawed by Russia and listed as an extremist organization] and supporters of nationalists. The people were accused of one-sided preplanned use of violence under the guise of Banderite terror:

'The supporters of Ukrainian nationalists use stones, sticks, bottles, tear-gas and other far from peaceful 'arguments.' It is obvious that such actions are planned beforehand rather than spontaneous. The confrontation reaches its climax when the putschists' advocates raise the ominous black and red cloth symbolizing the Banderite terror and 'Euromaidan' mayhem and fires. Outrage-fue*led Mejlists* and their brothers-in-arms assault the Crimean Parliament's building⁶⁹.'

On the web-site of the 'Crimean government' you may also find the PDF-version of the book entitled *Crimea*: *History of Return*.⁷⁰ The book's authors are Olga Kovitidi, the First Member of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation from the executive authority of the 'Republic of Crimea,' and Maksim Grigoriev, the member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, PhD in Political Science. There are 17 examples of hate speech in the book mainly aimed at Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars.

For instance, page 63 of this book has the following statement of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea dated March 13, 2014:

'The participants of an unconstitutional coup have no moral right to judge about the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum. **Neonazies** and **their accomplices** have no moral right to impose their will on the autonomy's citizens — children and grandchildren of the **defeaters of fascism**. **The murderers who shed the blood of Crimeans** — the fighters of Berkut [TN: special police force] and internal troops, as well as peaceful citizens — have no moral right to step on the **sacred Crimean land**.'

Page 339 of the said book contains the following quotation of Vladimir Konstantinov, the 'Chairman' of the Crimean 'Parliament':

'Vladimir Konstantinov says that the situation in Crimea is extremely tense. He explained that the people are afraid that Right Sector will come to Crimea after Maidan, and together with the militants of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Crimean Tatar radicals they will perpetrate a mass massacre and slaughter. Because there were people who openly threatened to decimate the Russian population in Crimea.'

Such expressions in the context of the political repressions on the peninsula promote the incitement of hatred towards Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and Muslims as the accusations of participating in such organizations like Right Sector⁷¹

⁶⁷ Publication Ukrainian Nazism Became the Basis of State Ideology of Ukraine — Sergey Aksyonov. Available at: <u>http://glava.rk.gov.</u> <u>ru/rus/index.htm/news/367009.htm</u>

⁶⁸ Article Spiders in the Jar. Available at: <u>http://bahch.rk.gov.ru/</u> <u>file/bahchisarayskaya_rayonnaya_gazeta_laquoslava_trudura-</u> <u>quo_6_17022017.pdf</u>

⁶⁹ Article The First Calendar Day of the Contemporary History of Crimea. Available at: <u>http://simfmo.rk.gov.ru/file/laquoseljskiy_trujenik_krimaraquo_8_ot_11_marta_2017_goda.pdf</u>

⁷⁰ Crimea: History of Return. Available at: <u>http://rk.gov.ru/rus/file/</u> krim_istoriya_vozvrascheniya.pdf

ⁿ Right Sector is a Ukrainian political party and non-governmental nationalist organization. It started as a civic movement having united the activists of Ukrainian radical organizations, manly nationalist and far-right ones. It was formed at the end of November 2013 when the revolution in Ukraine known as Euromaidan

or Hizb ut-Tahrir⁷² are used in Crimea since the occupation as a pretext for systemic political persecutions of Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and Muslims regardless of their affiliation with these organizations.

In particular, the false accusation of terrorism and affiliation with Right Sector led to the arrest and conviction of four citizens of Ukraine with a Ukrainian director Oleg Sentsov being one of them. But the four convicted Crimeans had nothing to do with Right Sector⁷³. Reckoning all pro-Ukrainian activists and Euromaidan participants in Right Sector in a number of cases defocuses the scope of this notion and views the whole civic community of Ukrainians as radical nationalists.

Furthermore, the Russian Federation declared the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People an extremist organization on April 26, 2016. Although the Order of the International Court of Justice as of April 19, 2017⁷⁴ obliged the Russian Federation to lift this ban, it was ignored⁷⁵. The members of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and

- ⁷² Hizb ut-Tahrir (Arabic: Party of Liberation) is a Sunni religious and political organization founded in 1953 in Jerusalem by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, a sharia appeals court judge. One of the differences from other Islamist organizations is that it rejects violence as a means to an end in principle. It was declared a 'terrorist organization' in Russia, but its activity is allowed in Ukraine and other countries. In 2016, a range of human rights groups, including Memorial Human Rights Center, Civic Assistance Committee, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis and Human Rights Institute, in their joint application regarding the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan to prolong the detention of R. M. Lapytov, the leader of the Muslim Problem Research Center human rights organization, who was accused of participating in the activity of Hizb ut-Tahrir, pointed out that 'this decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation is unlawful because neither organizational documents, nor the practice of its activity gives reasons to accuse it of calls for terrorism or terrorism itself," as well as noted that 'not a single European country has declared this party terrorist.'
- ⁷³ Report Crimea: Ukrainian Identity Banned / p. 6-8 (Sentsov-Kolchenko Case) / Crimean Human Rights Group 2016 — <u>http://</u> <u>crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Kryim-ukrainskaya-identichnost-pod-zapretom_Ru_KPG.pdf</u>
- ⁷⁴ A full text of the Order of the International Court of Justice on the claim Ukraine v. Russian Federation as of April 19, 2017 — <u>https://</u> www.slideshare.net/tsnua/ss-75181569?ref=https://www.unian. <u>net/politics/1884196-isk-ukrainyi-protiv-rossii-opublikovan-polnyiy-tekst-resheniya-suda-oon.html</u>
- ⁷⁵ The presentation of the Ukrainian delegation of the report of the International Court of Justice / Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations, October 26, 2017 — <u>http://ukraineun.org/press-center/407-vystup-delegatsiy-ukrayny-na-plenar-nomu-zasidanni-ga-oon-shchodo-zvitu-mizhnarodnogo-sudu-oon/</u>

regional Mejlises are subjected to politically motivated prosecution. The Mejlis is the only legitimate and internationally recognized self-government body of the Crimean Tatar people, and that is why a negative image of the Mejlis and its supporters which is being created on a large scale is projected on all Crimean Tatar people.

Twenty five people have already been arrested and taken into custody as of January 2018 with regard to the case of Crimean Muslims for allegedly participating in Hizb ut-Tahrir, although the accused Muslims denied their affiliation with this organization. All proceedings initiated against these Muslims have the sings of politically motivated prosecution, particularly for religious beliefs. There has not been a single case of terrorist threats, weapons or acts of violence as part of criminal proceedings related to participation in Hizb ut-Tahrir in Crimea. So the expression the **militants of Hizb ut-Tahrir** which is often used in the media landscape of Crimea is of deliberately misleading and negative nature.

Knowingly false accusations of the abovementioned social groups of the intentions to 'perpetrate a mass massacre and slaughter' are one of the elements of incitement to hatred and creating the image of an enemy for pro-Russian citizens of Crimea.

Hate speech is also present in official documents published on the web-sites of the 'Government of Crimea.' For instance, in the *National Population Composition* section of the document entitled *Municipal Program 'Strengthening the Russian Unity and Ethnocultural Development of Peoples Living in the Territory of the Municipal Settlement in the Urban District Feodosia of the Republic of Crimea for 2016-2018,*' Ukrainians were insultingly called Little Russians and Ukies⁷⁶.


At the same time, it is worth pointing out that we did not find examples of hate speech on the web-sites of the 'Government of Sevastopol,' 'Prosecutor's Office of Sevastopol' or the 'Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea' throughout the monitoring period, even though we performed a search using all key words selected for monitoring.

The web-site of the 'State Council of the Republic of Crimea' contained hate speech mainly in the statements of Vladimir Konstantinov, the 'Speaker of the Crimean Parliament,' for example:

'This Victory Day is special for Crimeans: it coincides with the seventieth anniversary of liberation of Crimea from the German-Fascist occupants. And the current generation of Crimeans celebrates this date with dignity — we have managed to **stop neo-Nazis**

began. At the parliamentary elections in autumn 2014, the Right Sector party won only 1.8% of votes and failed to make it into the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada). On November 17, 2014, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in the lawsuit filed by the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation declared Right Sector an extremist organization and prohibited its activity in Russia. The Crimean branch office of Right Sector was announced in Russia a terrorist organization.

⁷⁶ Document: Municipal Program 'Strengthening the Russian Unity and Ethnocultural Development of Peoples Living in the Territory of the Municipal Settlement in the Urban District Feodosia of the Republic of Crimea for 2016-2018.' Available at: <u>http://feo.rk.gov.</u> <u>ru/file/Feodosija_MP_ukreplenie_edinstv.pdf</u>



Objects of Hate Speech on Web-Sites of 'State Authorities' of Crimea

on the threshold of our home, we haven't let them in the peninsula's territory. But the **enemy hasn't been defeated yet**. It tramples on the Ukrainian land, shoots and burns the people who hold the same views as we do in Odesa and Donbass. On the eve of Victory Day, let's swear to our veterans, to the memory of those who died during the Great Patriotic War, that we will do everything possible to **swat the enemy like a fly** — just like **our fathers and grandfathers did it in 1945!**⁷⁷

On the web-site of the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol, during the monitoring period, we observed examples of hate speech in the expressions of local 'deputies' as well as in reprinted articles from different information publications.

For instance, the web-site published an interview with Sevastopol deputy Viacheslav Gorelov where he calls Ukrainians maidanuts⁷⁸.

'At first maidanuts will deal with us, Russians and the Russian-speaking population, and then they will start Ukrainizing Crimean Tatars⁷⁹.'

- ⁷⁷ Congratulatory speech of Vladimir Konstantinov, the chairman of the 'State Council of the Republic of Crimea,' on the occasion of Victory Day / web-site of the 'State Council of the Republic of Crimea,' 07.05.2014 — <u>http://crimea.gov.ru/news/07_05_14</u>
- ⁷⁸ An insult to Ukrainians as supporters of Euromaidan which consists of two elements: maidan (referring to the Maidan Nezalezhnosti the main square in Kyiv where the revolution known as Euromaidan took place) and nuts, which is crazy.
- ⁷⁹ Article 20th Day of Russian Spring in Sevastopol. Available at: <u>https://sevzakon.ru/view/pressa/1374/1375/1437/</u>

Overall, we registered 71 cases of incitement to hatred, with 70% concerning Ukrainians, on the web-sites of the 'Crimean authorities' during the monitoring period.

It should also be noted that hate speech is widely used by the representatives of the 'Crimean Authorities' de-facto in social media. Let's consider a couple of examples of hate speech use by Zaur Smirnov, the former chairman of the State Committee for International Relations and Deported Citizens, and Andrey Kozenko, a 'Duma member from the Republic of Crimea.'

Examples of Hate Speech Used by Representatives of 'Crimean Authorities' in Social Media

Andrey Kozenko: Today's series of terrorist attacks in Luhansk is no different from those in Nice, London, Paris, Brussels and other cities. If European politicians won't officially acknowledge it, it'll mean that they treat people in Donbass as an afterthought. The West must critically evaluate the attacks in Luhansk or admit that it covers for the Ukrainian terrorists!




Между сегодняшней серией терактов в Луганске и террористическими атаками на Ницуу. Лондон, Париик, Брюсоель и другие города стоит абсолютный знак равенства. Если европейские политики не признают это публично, то тем самым продемонстрируют, что жители Донбасса для них – люди второго сорта.

Запад должен дать жесткую оценку произошедшим в Луганске терактам, или признать, что покрывает украинских террористов!

Преступники пока не установлены, но будет проведено тщательное и компетентное расследование. Однако после целого ряда кощунственных заявлений украинских политиков, мне кажется, заказчик очевиден.

Я переговорил по телефону с Главой Луганской Народной Республики Игорем Плотницким и заверил его, что Россия – вместе с Луганском. Мы соболезнуем, поддерживаем и сопереживаем. The perpetrators haven't been established yet, but there will be a thorough and competent investigation. However, after a whole range of — profane statements from Ukrainian politicians, I think it's obvious who's behind it.

I talked on the phone to Igor Plotnitsky, the Head of the Luhansk People's Republic, and assured him that Russia is with Luhansk. We console and support you.



Zaur Smirnov: If the same happened with the Ukrainian language in Crimea or other regions of Russia, the Council of Europe or other foreign policy agency would have already filed a complaint, but when something like that happens in Ukraine it is the order of the day.

Nazi Darkness Absorbs Ukraine: Zaur Smirnov on the Closing of Russian Schools in Kherson Oblast

Pretty soon there won't be any Russian schools in Kherson Oblast of Ukraine which borders with Russia. It was announced in — Ukrainian mass media by Yevhen Krynytskyi, the Head of the Department for Education, Science and Youth of the Kherson Oblast State Administration.

A regular use of hate speech on the web-sites fully funded from the budget is evidence of direct interest and involvement of the occupant in creating controlled hatred among the population of the Crimean peninsula.

The monitoring results show that hatred on such websites is incited intentionally, methodically and on a large scale. The citizens of Ukraine as well as migrants, Crimean Tatars and Muslims are the main groups that hatred is incited towards.

Creating a negative image of these social, ethnic/civic and religious groups in people's consciousness leads to an escalation of the armed conflict following the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the outbreak of war in Donbass. Moreover, such actions adversely affect the population of the peninsula with Ukrainians, Muslims and Crimean Tatars being a great part of them.

At the same time, hate speech was used to create in society an atmosphere of fear and hatred towards the 'Enemies of Russia.' According to the monitoring results, the people living in Crimea are made to believe that there is a constant external threat towards Crimea with the help of various means of propaganda. The mass media and web-sites of the local de-facto 'authorities' acting in the territory of Crimea contain numerous publications calling on Crimeans to '*protect the Russian Federation from enemies*.' Ukrainians, Muslims and the population of Central Asia are the main enemies on such web-sites.

For instance, Vladimir Konstantinov, the 'Speaker of the Crimean Parliament,' made the following statement in an interview for the NTV news channel: '*They* **burn them alive**, *they* **make fun of it**, *they make a political show and hype about it. But we take it as a signal for mobilization. The* **enemy** *hasn't been defeated. There is only one thing you can do with* **Nazism** — *destroy it. No dialogue is possible with the* **Nazis**⁸⁰.'

This statement on NTV was presented without proper commentary, which is the use of hate speech in a soft form. Ukrainians were the object of hatred disguised as 'Nazis' as the Crimean politicians constantly operate with false facts that Nazism has become a part of the Ukrainian state ideology and Ukrainians support and agree with it on a large scale.

Moreover, such calls are disseminated by not only Crimean and Russian mass media, but the web-sites of different parties as well. For example, in January 2014, the Russian Bloc party posted on its web-site appeals for violence against Ukrainians who were called Banderite scum in the publication. Despite the fact that the web-site of the Russian Bloc (the source of the statement) does not work anymore, this text is still present on at least three other Crimean web-sites⁸¹.

Such actions lead to an increasing hostility towards Ukrainians and a growing atmosphere of hatred and fear among the peninsula's population.

At the same time, Crimean media and web-sites of the 'state authorities' of Crimea regularly publish announcements about the recruitment for volunteer military service in the Russian Federation⁸². At the time of our study, at least five such announcements were present on the website of the 'government' of Crimea only. Such announcements are posted regularly on the web-sties of local administrations as well. Thus, on February 14, 2017, Sergey Ardashev, the recruitment officer of the Military Registration and Enlistment Office of the 'Republic of Crimea,' said that more than 4000 Crimeans were enlisted in volunteer military service during the period of occupation⁸³.

⁸⁰ Video: Segodnia newscast on NTV as of May 05, 2014. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_iycRjl5kZg

⁸¹ Publication: Russian Bloc Party Announce the Formation of Self-Defense Squads and the Hunt for 'Banderites.' Available at: <u>http://sevastopol.su/node/51927</u>

⁸² Announcement of the recruitment for volunteer military service on the web-site of the 'Government of Crimea.' Available at: <u>http:// krgv.rk.gov.ru/rus/info.php?id=630221</u>

⁸³ Publication: About 4 Thousand People Have Been Enlisted in Military Service in Crimea. RIA Crimea: <u>http://crimea.ria.ru/society/20170214/1109123060.html</u>

On the web-sites controlled by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, propaganda of war and military service is interlaced with publications containing hate speech. For instance, there is an article on the web-site of the Zvezda TV channel of the Ministry of Defense entitled '*Western* Factory of Lies: the USA Made up Holodomor so that Ukrainians Become Russophobes⁸⁴.' The article's author questions Holodomor, a historical fact of the genocide of the Ukrainian people. This is an example of hate speech use, particularly 'publications and statements that question the generally acknowledged historical facts of violence and discrimination.'

Such campaigns promoting the service in the Russian army are regularly conducted in Crimea as well, including among children and adolescents, with the support of the 'Ministry of Education' of Crimea. Such propaganda is mainly funded from the budgets of the Russian Federation and Crimea⁸⁵.

An aggressive propaganda of military service backed by the incitement of hatred towards Ukrainians helps local authorities recruit Crimeans more efficiently.

Such actions make the number of Crimeans who enter the Russian army grow, which is a violation of international humanitarian law and a military crime under the Rome Statute.

The frequent and organized activities of the Russian Federation in Crimea intended to create an image of the enemy of Ukrainians have resulted in an intensified military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which not only impacts the situation inside Ukraine, but also generates serious security threats for the whole region.

HATE SPEECH ON AIR OF MAIN RUSSIAN CHANNELS BROADCASTING IN CRIMEA

We found 479 examples of hate speech use on the web-sites of Russian TV channels Russia-1, NTV and Channel One during the monitoring period: 1 example of harsh hate speech, 46 examples of medium hate speech, and 432 examples of the soft form of hate speech.

Hatred was incited towards the following groups in the Russian newscasts during the monitoring period:

Nationality/ethnicity/ citizenship	324 examples
Religious groups	35 examples
Social groups	120 examples

The most frequent object of hate speech was the groups of people who share the same nationality, ethnicity and/or citizenship or residence in some specific territory. Thus, our monitoring registered the use of hate speech with regard to 36 such groups. Among these groups, hate speech as regards Ukrainians (as an ethnos and/or civic community of citizens) was observed in 57% of cases.

The largest number of examples of incitement to hatred — 184 — concerned Ukrainians (based on citizenship and/or ethnic origin).

For instance, the 'Vremia' newscast on Channel One as of May 03, 2014⁸⁶ addressing the topic of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, cited Valeriy Bolotov who was announced a 'people's governor of Luhansk Oblast': '*We will protect our land from neo-fascist occupants and murderers.*' In his speech, Boltov called the citizens of Luhansk Oblast the '*people of Luhansk*' and presented the rest of Ukrainians as '*neo-fascist occupants and murderers.*'

Russian television propaganda forms the image of Ukrainians as fascists, Nazis, '**savages** *murdering their fellow-citizens in a grisly manner*.' The armed conflict in eastern Ukraine was called by the Russian news channels in spring 2014 the punitive operation and Ukrainians participating in it were viewed as punishers.

For example, the anchorman of 'Vesti' newscast on Channel One as of May 11, 2014⁸⁷ described the events in Mariupol the following way: '**Kyiv punishers drowned** *the main national holiday* **in blood**.'

The identification of Ukrainians as *punishers* was especially emphasized in spring 2014 when the war in Donbass began. The expressions *punishers* and *punitive operation* were used in the studied newscasts of the Russian channels more than 200 times in May 2014 alone.

It is worth noting that these expressions have an additional negative connotation, as after World War II Soviet mass media, and later Ukrainian and Russian mass media, had used the word *punishers* for many


⁸⁴ Publication: Western Factory of Lies: the USA Made up Holodomor so that Ukrainians Become Russophobes. Available at: <u>https://tvzvezda.ru/news/qhistory/content/201702130902-661z.htm</u>


⁸⁵ Analytical Report: Human Rights Under Conditions of Militarization in Crimea. Available at:<u>http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/book-RU_A4.pdf</u>

⁸⁶ 'Vremia' newscast as of May 03, 2014. Available at: <u>https://www.wttv.ru/news/issue/2014-05-03/21:00#10</u>


⁸⁷ 'Vesti' newscast as of May 11, 2014. Available at: <u>https://russia.tv/</u> video/show/brand_id/5402/episode_id/986747/

Objects of Hate Speech on Russian TV Channels Ethnicity/Nationality/Citizenship





Other Groups (7%)




Hate Speech with Regard to Religious Groups

decades to describe the atrocities of SS battalions⁸⁸ and other fascists fighting on Hitler's side who were subsequently convicted by the Nuremberg Tribunal. That is why drawing similar parallels creates in the public conscience a strongly negative image of the whole modern Ukrainian society, an image of the 'enemy' who needs to be mercilessly destroyed like Nazis during World War II.

When highlighting the events in Odesa on May 02, 2014⁸⁹ and the armed conflict in Donbass, the Russian channels show only one point of view. At the same time, they often use such a form of hate speech as quoting xenophobic statements without commentary. Such statements sometimes contain direct calls for exterminating Ukrainians and most of the times accuse Ukrainians of criminality or inferiority.

⁸⁹ Confrontation in Odesa between the supporters of Euromaidan and pro-Russian activists on May 02, 2014 resulting in skirmishes in the city center and the fire in the Trade Unions Building leaving almost 50 people dead.



Hate speech with regard to social groups

⁸⁸ SS (short for German Schutzstaffel - Protection Squadron) paramilitary formations of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP). During 1933–1945, the SS ran the concentration camps and extermination camps where millions of people died.

For instance, 'Vremia' news cast on Channel One as of May 03, 2014⁹⁰ had the following things said about the events in Odesa: '*We need to stop this* **fascism**, *they are* **not humans**, *even fascists did not kill their fellow citizens*.' A similar quotation of an Odesa resident was given in 'Vesti Nedeli' weekly news edition on Russia One dated May 18, 2014: 'Beasts — *they are* inhuman monsters⁹¹.' 'Vremia' newscast dated May 17, 2017 cited a Donetsk protester: '*To get rid of the* brown plague⁹². *They are* savages⁹³.'

In the general context of the studied news editions, such utterances project not only on the people who perpetrated those crimes in Odesa, but on all citizens of Ukraine.

We also noticed that Russian channels accused all Ukrainians of historical crimes which is a medium level of hate speech.

For instance, Russian propaganda often calls Ukrainians **Banderites**. Moreover, news anchors occasionally mention the crimes committed by Stepan Bandera during World War II. Everybody who fought on Bandera's side during the war are also called **Banderites** and, at the same time, **bloodthirsty criminals**, **fascists** and **punishers**. By doing so, they equate the citizens of modern Ukraine as Banderites, putting such images in people's minds.

Due to the use of such methods of propaganda, the responsibility in the public consciousness for the crimes of a certain group of people committed more than 70 years ago falls on the citizens of modern Ukraine and Ukrainians as an ethnos. At the same time, the residents of Crimea and uncontrolled Donbass are opposed to the rest of Ukrainians, and thus their affiliation with Ukraine is eliminated.

Crimeans are called **Russians**, and Donbass residents — a **separate nation** which reportedly demands its right to self-determination. It should be noted that, according to the latest All-Ukrainian Population Census carried out in 2001⁹⁴, there is no separate nation in this territory, and the population mostly consists of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians.

Hence, the Russian TV channels help incite hatred towards Ukrainians not only in the consciousness of Russians who are their main target audience, but also among the citizens of the separate territories of Ukraine which are covered by the broadcasting of these mass media. Such actions of the Russian agitators are another way of escalating the conflict in eastern Ukraine and legalizing the occupation of Crimea in the eyes of the local population.

We also found statements in Crimean mass media about Ukraine being 'a Western part of Rus' and that 'Eastern Rus must save its brothers from the Ukrainian occupation.' For example, one such publication mentioned ethnic Ukrainians exclusively in the humiliating and insulting context (crypto-Banderites, potential traitors)⁹⁵. The author continued by addressing the Russians living in Ukraine: 'The war goes on, even if you don't see it all the time. Restoring the original Russian boundaries is only a matter of time. Ukraine is doomed. It is autumn 1942 on the war calendar.'

During the monitoring period, we also observed a lot of references towards Ukrainians in a humiliating and insulting context, including in news about crime.

It is noteworthy that the degree of hatred towards Ukrainians in 2017 became significantly lower as compared with 2014. The citizens of Ukraine were almost never referred to as **punishers** and **Banderites** in the news. At the same time, the residents of the uncontrolled territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts are no longer mentioned as a separate nation, and are rather called the 'citizens of self-proclaimed republics.'

In 2017, the number of cases of hate speech use with regard to Ukrainians reduced considerably when compared with the same period in 2014 (spring 2014 — 146 examples of hate speech, spring 2017 — 38). Overall the number of examples of incitement to hatred remained about the same (234 in 2014 and 245 in 2017). In addition to Ukrainians, in 2017, the Russian TV channels stirred up hatred mainly towards the residents of Central Asia, migrants and Muslims. It is notable that there were no cases of hate speech used concerning the residents of Central Asia and migrants in the television programs under study in 2014.

Russian propaganda in 2017 paid a lot of attention to the conflict in Syria and the situation in the Middle East. Muslims and migrants from Central Asia were often viewed as the main threat for people living in Russia and Crimea.

For instance, the news anchor of 'Vesti' on April 05, 2017⁹⁶ used the following phrase: '*A group of* migrants

⁹⁰ 'Vremia' news edition as of May 03, 2014. Available at: <u>http://www.ltv.ru/news/issue/2014-05-03/21:00#4</u>

⁹¹ 'Vesti Nedeli' weekly news edition as of May 18, 2014. Available at: <u>https://goo.gl/wh6n8y</u>


⁹² Brown Plague is the established metaphoric expression in Russian language for fascism.

⁹³ 'Vremia' news edition as of May 17, 2014. Available at: <u>https://</u> <u>www.1tv.ru/news/issue/2014-05-17/21:00#6</u>

⁹⁴ All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001/ State Statistics Committee of Ukraine <u>http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/</u> general/nationality/

⁹⁵ Do Not Require from Russia Ridiculous Actions and Meaningless Sacrifices / ForPost. News of Sevastopol, February 13, 2017 — <u>http://sevastopol.su/node/128114</u>

⁹⁶ 'Vesti' newscast as of April 05, 2017. Available at: <u>https://russia.</u> <u>tv/video/show/brand_id/58500/episode_id/1488331/video_id/1611325/</u>



Objects of Hate Speech on Russian TV Channels

who recruited **potential militants** was detained in Saint-Petersburg.' Mentioning migrants in crime news this way creates in the public perception an image of migrants from Central Asia as potential terrorists and radical supporters of the terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

At the same time, the use of different types of hate speech formed an image of Muslims who are also potential **terrorists** because of their religion.

Hate speech with regard to these groups was used in the medium and soft form. For instance, 'Vesti' news on May 29, 2014⁹⁷ broadcast a story about the detention and shooting of a 'local gang' which accentuated the religion of suspects and their countrymen.

'His fellow-citizens told him about the purest religion *that he* needed to give his life for — *but to* take the lives of other people *was even better,'* the news anchor commented on the detention of one of the gang members.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the program's authors, in violation of the presumption of innocence, said that the detained was going to be a suicide attacker and his fellow-citizens were **terrorists'** accomplices. Such practice of public accusations of people before court judgments is also very common in the case of Crimeans who were subjected to politically motivated persecutions. That is why calling some people criminals on account of their religious beliefs (Islam) is especially threatening for the residents of Crimea, particularly the Crimean Tatar people who are predominantly Muslims.

The residents of Central Asia were the objects of incitement to hatred mainly in the form of references in the humiliating or insulting context in crime news intended to create an image of these people as potential terrorists.

For example, the anchorman of 'Segodnia' news edition on NTV as of May 05, 2017⁹⁸ linked the detention of terrorist suspects with the fact that they live in a certain territory:

'Six citizens of the republics of Central Asia were detained. They came to Russia to work, but in the last two years they have been recruiting Central-Asia-born individuals for terrorist activities.'

Overall, within the monitoring period, we noted 34 examples of such hate speech relating to the residents of Central Asia as a group of people living in this territory. And their guilt of committing grave offences is claimed as a proven fact already at the stage of their detention, that is long before the court's judgment.

The main danger of such incitement to hatred for Crimeans is that most Crimean Tatars during deportation lived in the territory of Central Asia and are Muslims. Some of them are still citizens of the republics of Central Asia. During the period of the occupation of Crimea, there was a range of politically motivated criminal proceedings regarding Muslims and Crimean Tatars. A mass use of hate speech with regard to these groups leads to a more tolerant attitude of society towards the prosecution of these people on the part of the occupation authorities. This situation enables security officials in Crimea to enhance repressions against these discriminated groups.

⁹⁷ 'Vesti' newscast as of May 29, 2014. Available at: <u>https://russia.tv/</u> video/show/brand_id/5402/episode_id/991276/

⁹⁸ 'Segodnia' newscast as of May 05, 2017 — <u>http://www.ntv.ru/vid-eo/1416193/</u>

HATE SPEECH IN CRIMEAN ONLINE MEDIA

While monitoring the web-sites of Crimean mass media selected for the study, we revealed 168 examples of hate speech with 58% of them accounting from only two sources: the Sevastopol web-site ForPost which belongs to Kazhanov Sergey, a 'deputy of the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol'⁹⁹, and that of Crimeainform controlled by Maksim Nikolayenko who ran as a candidate for the head of the occupation administration of Simferopol in September 2017¹⁰⁰.

94 registered examples of hate speech in Crimean online media refer to the monitoring period of 2014, 74 - to the period of 2017.

The main objects of hate speech were the groups of people who shared the same ethnicity, nationality and/ or citizenship (130 examples) and social groups (26 examples). Ukrainians as an ethnic and/or civic community were the major objects of verbal attacks in one form or another (123 examples).

Ukrainians appear in the materials of the abovementioned mass media as fascists, Nazis, Banderites. Ukraine is called a neo-Nazi state, and its authorities the military junta.


The authors of many examples of hate speech in the studied sources are politicians of different levels, public activists and experts quoted by publications, as well as materials' authors and editors themselves.

⁹⁹ Kazhanov Sergey Petrovich. Available at: <u>http://sevastopol.su/</u> <u>node/111862</u> Thus, for instance, ForPost wrote the following in July 2014: 'Sustaining huge casualties, the Ukrainian junta is desperately trying to save the day and turn the tables in the information war. Things that the pro-fascist Kyiv administration protests so fiercely against are now used as propaganda. Even 'The Sacred War' [one of the most famous Soviet songs of the Second World War] song which is so odious to them has been changed. Covered in the American flag, the Ukrainian singer with crazy eyes sings this song to the accompaniment of the photos of maimed bodies of peaceful citizens of southeastern Ukraine¹⁰¹.'

And in June 2017, Yuriy Portov, a reporter from the Krymskiye Izvestia newspaper, asked a whole range of chauvinistic questions and gave no less chauvinistic answers to them himself: 'Why do we care about this alien-alien Ukraine, previously known as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic? Did enemies or, as they say, fraternal people live there before the demise of the Soviet Union? And where did these people go when they had suddenly become independent and self-sufficient? It seems like the citizens of Ukraine that we know have been replaced by con men, who pulled a stacked deck out of their sleeve, being mere puppets rather than intelligent, conscious and honest people,' he wrote¹⁰².

All abovementioned examples refer to different types of soft hate speech, like 92% of all examples found by the monitors.


¹⁰² Love and Hatred: Feel the Difference. Available at: <u>http://new.crimiz.ru/rubriki/85-politika/4791-lyubov-i-nenavist-pochuvstvujte-raznitsu</u>



Distribution of Hate Speech between Web-Sites of Crimean Mass Media

¹⁰⁰ Simferopol Has Elected the Mayor. Available at: <u>https://ria.ru/poli-tics/20170922/1505298751.html</u>

¹⁰¹ Article: Fascist Scum Uses 'The Sacred War' song to Boost the Morale of Ukrainian Punishers. Available at: <u>http://sevastopol. su/news/fashistskaya-nechist-ispolzuet-pesnyu-svyashchennaya-voyna-dlya-podderzhaniya-boevogo-duha</u>



Objects of Hate Speech on Web-Sites of Crimean Mass Media

At the same time, almost all examples of medium and harsh hate speech have been observed in only two editions — Krymskaya Pravda daily newspaper which literally belongs to the family of Bakharev Konstantin¹⁰³, a Duma deputy from the 'Republic of Crimea,' and the official newspaper of the local 'parliament' - Krymskiye Izvestia.

Six of eleven medium hate speech examples were found in Krymskaya Pravda, two — in Krymskiye Izvestia, and the remaining ones in RIA Crimea, along with NTS Sevastopol and ForPost with one example of hate speech in each of them.

Thus, in June 2014, Krymskaya Pravda newspaper called for smashing the fascist scum. 'The leaders of New Russia chosen by the people and militias stand up against the Nazi junta that has seized power in former Ukraine. <...> This is a war with fascism. Just like 70 years ago,

there is 'civilized' West behind the Nazi vermin. But just like always the truth is on our side. And that means that God is with us. We are proud of you, fellows. Smash the fascist scum! < ... > We want all of you dead, we want every single one of you stone dead, bastards!' the newspaper wrote¹⁰⁴.

In February 2017, Krymskaya Pravda published an interview with Natalia Kiseleva, a pro-Russian political analyst, who literally called for fighting with Crimeans who support Ukraine: 'Crimeans, those who could, wanted to and did fight the Ukrainian neo-Nazism for 22 years during which time Crimea had been separated from its 'native' country the so-called 'nenka.' We can't afford to turn a blind eye to the existence among us of the carriers of this ideology that came from beyond Perekop [a city that existed before 1920] which formed a link between the Crimean peninsula and the mainland] per se, but the people on the peninsula infected with the neo-Nazi virus - it is not for nothing that they were

¹⁰³ See: Faces of Russian Propaganda: Owners of Crimean Newspapers. Available at: https://ru.krymr.com/a/27879631.html and Bakharev Konstantin Mikhaylovich. Available at: http://zampolit. com/dossier/bakharev-konstantin-mikhaylovich/

¹⁰⁴ God is Right rather Than Might. Available at: <u>http://c-pravda.ru/</u> newspapers/2014/06/06/ne-v-sile-bog-a-v-pravde

called 'maidanuts.' What do we usually do with sick people? We treat them. Either therapeutically or surgically. In the former case, we can do everything possible at various fronts: informational, educational, awareness-raising... In the latter case, law-enforcement agencies, as the expression goes, have an open field for work.'

One of the publications of Krymskaya Pravda called Ukrainians little brothers.¹⁰⁵. It is worth noting that in Russian this phrase usually denotes pets.

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		амах и монастырях Симферопольской и Крымской епархия верующие вознесут мире на Украине. Будет происходить это в попдень 28 июля - в День крещения Руси.

ABOUT OUR LITTLE BROTHERS

In the churches and monasteries of Simferopol and Crimean eparchy, the faithful will pray for peace in Ukraine. The prayer will start at noon on the 28th of July — the day of Christianization of Rus.

Aside from Ukrainians in general, the main objects of hate speech were also the following groups: the Mejlis supporters (12 examples), Crimean Tatars (7 examples) and Muslims (5 examples). These examples constitute 14% of the total number. Taking into account the fact that almost all supporters of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Crimea are the representatives of the indigenous community¹⁰⁶, we may say that all these manifestations of hatred are aimed mostly at Crimean Tatars. It is also notable that this indicator gets significantly higher during some periods when there are high-profile events mostly related to the Russia-guided repressions against Crimean Tatars.

Most of the time, Crimean Tatars are depicted as radical Islamists and extremists, and their representative body — the Mejlis — as a terrorist and extremist organization.

For instance, in June 2014, ForPost published an indicative article titled *Kolomoiskyi, Yarosh and Dzhemilev Intend to* **Shed Russian Blood All Over the Crimean Land**. This article, among other things, said the following: '*Right now* **Tatar refugees**' are flowing into Dnipropetrovsk from Western Ukraine. Trains from Kovel and Lviv come at night. **Militants** from radical Islamist groups arrive at guarded platforms. They fled Crimea three months ago, on the eve of the referendum on reunion with Russia. They have been training in Galician camps all this time. And now it's time to fight. The new Punitive The Crimean Tatar Special Battalion is their main striking force. Locals say that the Islamists killed a few Azov fishermen — to intimidate all those who approach the Russian shore on their motor boats. And bring the Syrian nightmare to Crimea! It is not for nothing that the Mejlis headed by Mustafa Dzhemilev succeeded so much in recruiting young Tatars to form the squads of mujahideen. Militants high on drugs were speaking loudly on the phone and calling for an 'armed detachment.' Although no detachment arrived, the Islamic web-sites already started talking about the beginning of the insurgency¹⁰⁷.'

Given the tendencies revealed during the study, we may assume that Crimean mass media fulfill their common task of forming an image of an enemy of Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatar people which in its overwhelming majority did not recognize the occupation of the Crimean peninsula.

These assumptions are partly confirmed by the number of comments stirring up hatred which people leave not only under the articles with hate speech, but also under the materials without it.

Although we did not monitor the comments separately as part of this study, their shallow analysis showed that the tone of discussion on different platforms is set by the so-called 'professional trolls' using a range of one and the same accounts. And hate speech in such comments is used in much harsher forms than in articles themselves.

A series of niche Crimean online media systematically uses hate speech in their publications and impacts rather considerably the radically-minded segment of the pro-Russian population.

These are the Crimean information web-sites Novoross [New Russian] (novoross.info) with one of its founders Yuriy Pershykov, the former Deputy Minister of Information Policy of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) and a current member of the Board of the 'Crimean Branch' of the Union of Journalists of Russia, as well as Unbowed Crimea (freetavrida.org) and the online newspaper Crimean Echo (c-eho.info). These resources use hate speech the most often.

For the sake of illustration, let's consider the headlines and leads¹⁰⁸ of the materials published during the first week of September 2017:

¹⁰⁵ Publication in Krymskaya Pradva <u>http://c-pravda.ru/newspa-pers/2017/07/28/den-kreshheniya-rusi</u>

¹⁰⁶ Crimean Tatars had been demanding from Ukraine that they should be given the status of indigenous people, and Ukraine must restore the historical justice as well as their rights as a nation that suffered the deportation out of Crimea arranged by Stalin's regime on May 18, 1944. After the occupation of Crimea by Russia on March 20, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved the resolution which recognized Crimean Tatars as the indigenous people.

¹⁰⁷ Kolomoiskyi, Yarosh and Dzhemilev Intend to Shed Russian Blood All Over the Crimean Land. Available at: <u>http://sevastopol. su/news/kolomoyskiy-yarosh-i-dzhemilev-namereny-zalit-krymskuyu-zemlyu-russkoy-krovyu</u>

¹⁰⁸ Lead — a summery or a 'header' of an article consisting of 3-5 lines (three sentences max) that formulates a problem and a conclusion. The opening paragraph of an article, an informative fragment that attracts the reader's attention to the given material. The main criterion of a lead is its compactness which makes it possible for a reader to understand what an author of an article/material wants to inform them about.

'Simferopol Evicts the 'Filareterians' [supporters of Patriarch Filaret] Because They Refused to Register under Russian Law. Russian law-enforcement bodies evict the sectarians of the Ukrainian nationalist group Kyiv Patriarchate from their rented quarters in Simferopol' (Novoross, September 01, 2017).

'Lutuhyne has Celebrated the Third Anniversary of Liberation from the Ukrainian Invaders' (Novoross, September 02, 2017).'

'The Ukrainian aggressors Have Not Yet Withdrawn Heavy Weaponry from Donbass' (Novoross, September 03, 2017).

'The Donetsk Gauleiter Demands That the "Representative Offices" of Ukrainian Nazis Should Be Established in LPR and DPR,' 'Shifting the Blame: the Head of the Ukrainian Gestapo Accused the Russian Intelligence Agencies of "Organizing Terrorist Attacks in Ukraine," 'The Ministry of Defense of the LPR Informed about Another Crime of Drunk 'Warriors of Light' [this is how Ukrainians were called in the song by Lyapis Trubetskoy of the same title devoted to the Euromaidan protesters] / 'Ukrainian punishers in Donbass Who Are Pompously Called by the Propaganda of the Kyiv Regime 'Warriors of Light' Continue Committing Crimes against the Peaceful Population of Donbass..,' 'The Kyiv Regime Has Become the Guise of Maidan for the European Audience Hiding Its Savage Grin — the Political Analyst' (Novoross, September 04, 2017).

'How Long Are We Going to Feed You? The Driver Pushed the **Punisher's** Widow out of the Bus in Kyiv,' 'Amnesty for ATO Cutthroats Will Unlikely Promote a Resolution of the Donbass Conflict' (Novoross, September 05, 2017).

'Kill a Fanatic Fascist.' The Posters of the Great Patriotic War are Relevant Today as Well' (Novoross, September 06, 2017).

'The Occupants Ukrainize the Captured Regions of Donetsk Oblast' (Novoross, September 07, 2017).

Novoross used hate speech in headlines and leads of 20 articles only in one week in September 2017. This web-site also often applies various illustrational tools to promote hatred.



Hate speech is similarly used on the pages of another online newspaper Unbowed Crimea:

'The Speaker of the Seimas of Lithuania Supported the Blockade of Crimea. The Henichesk District Authorities Demonstrated at the Chonhar Telecommunications Tower to Viktoras Pranckietis, the Speaker of the Seimas of Lithuania, Who Visited and Supported the **Mejlis Extremists** Who Have Arranged the Blockade of Crimea' (Unbowed Crimea, September 03, 2017).

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'Another **Banderite** Has Left Crimea. Leonid Kuzmin, One of the Main Activists of the 'Ukrainian Cultural Center,' Is No Longer in Crimea,' **'Banderite Author***ities* Continue Torturing Journalist Vasyl Muravytskyi' (Unbowed Crimea, September 04, 2017).

'Two First Grade Students in Henichesk Refused to Study in **Ukie Language**. The Parents are Dead Set Against the Imposition of **Banderite ideology** on Their Children' (Unbowed Crimea, September 06, 2017). Ukraine and Ukrainians are the main object of hatred on these resources. Although the preliminary monitoring showed that Crimean Tatars and their representative body Mejlis, as well as Muslims, are also very often subjected to hate speech.

It is worth noting that these resources started using hate speech long before the occupation of Crimea by Russia. Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars were the main objects of hate speech attacks at that time. These online media used the harshest forms of hate speech, including calls for violence and repression. However, after the occupation of the peninsula, the number of hate speech examples increased significantly and the rhetoric became even more strident.


Thus, for instance, back in 2010, Novoross.info published a comment of Yuriy Pershykov who argued against naming a school in Partenit¹⁰⁹ the name of Abdul Teifuk, a Crimean Tatar hero of World War II, as well as practically approved of the fact that Crimean Tatars should not be allowed to live in this settlement.

'Koideshler is an organization established by Ibraim Voiennyi to obtain land on the south coast of Crimea. This organization has repeatedly tried to enter Partenit, but it hasn't managed to because of the resistance on the part of the local Orthodox community. There are no Crimean Tatars there today. Yes, the Soviet law gives the Hero of the Soviet Union the right to have his bust installed in the territory he once lived in. Nevertheless, I think there is no point in naming a school after Teifuk in Partenit because the school is Russian,' Pershykov claimed at that time¹¹⁰.

In May 2014, the web-site published a statement from the militants of the so-called Self-Defense of Crimea that went to the South-East of Ukraine to combat, as the resource wrote, the **junta**. 'We are not in the prisoner-taking business, we are in the killing-junta business... We are going to help the people of the South-East and destroy everything on our way,' went the statement¹¹¹.

It also posted a statement from Aleksei Chaly, the 'people's mayor' of Sevastopol: 'Of course, I welcome the idea of Russia bringing its troops into Ukraine. I'm not only supporting the idea, I'm exasperated that Russia hasn't done

¹¹⁰ Coordinator of Youth Cossack Movement: Koideshler Tries to Position Itself As a Legitimate Organization on the South Coast of Crimea by Suggesting That a School in Partenit Should Be Named after Teifuk. Available at: <u>http://www.novoross.info/economics/2479-koordinator-molodezhnogo-dvizheniya-kazakov-predlagaya-pridat-partenitskoj-shkole-imya-tejfuka-kojdeshler-pytaetsya-pozicionirovat-sebya-na-yubk.html</u>



The Illustration on Crimean Echo web site depicting a 'bloodthirsty Ukrainian' with a knife against the swastika background

it yet. We need to eliminate the hot spot. We also need to protect our brotherly people who are begging for our help for the umpteenth time. I hope that the President of Russia makes up his mind to do so. I really-really hope so. And our troops are sure to march on the streets of Donetsk, Kharkiv, Odesa and Luhansk with the Victory Parade. Without a doubt. And out veterans will have no fear to walk outside wearing St. George Ribbons and other insignias and medals. Those that they earned protecting our lives, our country. Those that the Banderites, this scum that we should have wiped off the face of the Earth a long time ago, forbid them to wear. Rubbish needs to be removed¹¹².

In October 2016, Novoross claimed that 'a great disaster may happen because of the Crimean authorities' flirtation with the Mejlists.' The web-site informed that approximately 200 Crimean Tatars fight for the ISIL, that 'Crimean Tatars raped a Russian girl' and held a range of other demands against the representatives of the indigenous community of Crimea. 'Only an open, clear and tough attitude of the Head of the Republic and Crimean authorities will not let a great disaster happen at our friendly, multinational Crimean home,' the web-site summed up¹¹³.

Calls for different reprisals may be found on the Crimean Echo web-site.

Thus, on May 1, 2014, the resource published a statement from Vladimir Konstantinov, the Chairman of the Parliament of the 'Republic of Crimea,' who threatened Ukraine with mass casualties: 'One person killed in Donbass will cost them ten people on their side. This is the law of war. It will be their last attack. These people are

¹⁰⁹ An urban-type settlement on the south coast of Crimea. It is situated 15 km south-west from Alushta and 59 km south-east from Simferopol.

^{III} Crimean Militiamen Threatened Junta to Send Two Battalions to Kramatorsk and Shoot to Kill. Available at: <u>http://www.novoross.</u> <u>info/people/25678-krymskie-opolchency-prigrozili-hunte-vydvinutsya-dvumya-batalonami-na-kramatorsk-i-bit-na-porazhenie-video.html</u>

¹¹² Aleksei Chaly Called for Brining in Troops into Ukraine: 'Banderites are Scum That We Should Have Wiped off the Face of the Earth a Long Time Ago. Available at: <u>http://www.novoross.info/</u> politiks/25698-aleksey-chalyy-prizval-k-vvodu-voysk-na-ukrainubanderovschina-nechist-kotoruyu-uzhe-davno-nado-steret-s-licazemli.html

¹¹³ The Shadow of the ISIL: Crimea on the Threshold of a Great Disaster. Available at: <u>http://www.novoross.info/krim/33290-ten-igilakrym-na-poroge-bolshoy-bedy.html</u>



Nazis whom Crimea tries to save itself from in a lifeboat

insane — these who have taken over in Kyiv. *We, the Russians,* will have to end this Nazi mayhem sooner or later. *We'll have to come together and end it so that they don't disgrace the Russian world before the whole world*¹¹⁴.'

In February 2015, Crimean Echo informed that the protesters in Yalta, taking into account that '*there is a war against Russia today*,' '*called for fighting against the 'fifth column,*' Western-minded influence agents, for the sovereign economy and our own path of development¹¹⁵.'

In November 2015, highlighting another public meeting in Yalta, Crimean Echo claimed that the protesters '...call on the Russian authorities to make every effort to protect the Russian population from discrimination and physical violence in Ukraine and the Baltic states.' 'It is also necessary to draw the focus of law-enforcement bodies toward the active propaganda of Russophobia via the Ukrainian online media, Ukrainian libraries in Russia's territory or through the so-called national and cultural societies (like the Prosvita Society and others),' the edition wrote¹¹⁶.

Crimean Echo also described its vision of the solution of the so-called Crimean Tatar problem, having pointed out, inter alia, the following: '*The only way to solve this problem seems to be* **ceasing the concession and peace offering policy** *as regards the* '**chosen ones**' *in prejudice of* **others**. *In this case, we mean the legalization of the land squatting, construction of cult institutions in any convenient territories, priority in the provision of housing on ethnic grounds, quotas for employment and civil service, invitation of* **migrants from Central Asia and Turkey** *for permanent residency in Crimea aimed at* **changing the ethnic composition** *etc*¹¹⁷.'



The cartoon depicting Euromaidan protesters as fascists with the Right Sector's flag and Nazi swastika on their back

In February 2016, Crimean Echo published an interview with Viktor Kharabuga, the pro-Russian political analyst who literally called on the security officials to deal with the supporters of the Meilis of the Crimean Tatar People: 'This threat does exist in Crimea today; there was an ethnic conflict; we saw its apotheosis, its climax in February 2014 at the building of the Supreme Council of Crimea. And it almost escalated into a hot stage ... Let's put it this way: at least three thousand activists were brought by Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev. If it weren't for this gunpowder, a match would have nothing to light. And these people, this 'gunpowder,' are still here, so is the problem. Saying that they have no supporters and that the Meilists have only two or three people as a back-up would be wrong: they do have supporters, and the number of them is pretty large. I'm not trying to say that they prevail, but they do exist and are supported by a certain number of people. Today, everything depends on the authorities, on the law enforcement agencies¹¹⁸.'

After a while, Crimean Echo called for removing all members of the opposition from Russia. 'We don't need to send them to prison. Let it be. But we may give them a cold shoulder though. Let them live among their brothers and friends who will welcome them as political refugees with open arms. Crimea once rose to the occasion and managed to get rid of such terrorists as Chubarov, Iliasov and senile Dzhemilev...,' Igor Noskov, the author, wrote¹¹⁹.

A little later, Noskov called for kicking out of Crimea all supporters of Ukraine: 'I personally, and all my friends and people that I know, want that all potential Ukrainian militants living in Crimea and who are waiting for the signal to begin terrorist actions be exiled from Crimea to prevent bloodshed. Natalia Poklonskaya, the honored

¹¹⁴ These Streets Haven't Seen a March Like This. Available at: <u>http://old.kr-eho.info/index.php?name=News&op=printpage&sid=12029</u>

¹¹⁵ Yalta against Maidan in Russia. Available at: <u>http://old.kr-eho.info/</u> index.php?name=News&op=article&sid=13459

¹¹⁶ Relevant As Never Before. Available at: <u>http://c-eho.info/tochka-na-karte/yalta/item/1791-aktualno-kak-nikogda</u>

¹¹⁷ It Is High Time We Ask Ourselves: How Are We Going to Live in Our

Crimea? Available at: <u>http://c-eho.info/diskussiya/item/1861-prish-lo-vremya-sprosit-sebya-kak-budem-zhit-dalshe-v-nashem-krymu</u>

¹¹⁸ If There Is Indeed a Threat to Peace in Crimea, it Does Not Come from Crimean Tatars Who Are Citizens of Russia. Available at: <u>http://c-eho.info/intervyu/item/2123-esli-ugroza-miru-v-krymu-iest-to-ona-iskhodit-ne-ot-krymskikh-tatar-grazhdan-rossii</u>

¹¹⁹ Aliens. Available at: <u>http://c-eho.info/diskussiya/item/2439-chuzhie</u>



The cartoon depicting a Ukrainian as a Nazi with swastika behind his back. He holds a Molotov cocktail¹²² and the Ukrainian flag

Prosecutor of Crimea, forced out terrorists Chubarov and Dzhemilev [leaders of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People] — and Crimea is still fine, nothing bad happed to it. The most trigger-happy American President has not atom-bombed Crimea before, he is unlikely to do it now because of several dozens of exiled Banderites. If Yankees love criminals so much, let them give shelter to them¹²⁰.'

Moreover, such publications use a range of cartoons and other graphic images containing hate speech in their visual content. They use the fascist and pirate symbols, as well as the pictures of weapons, evils spirits and death when creating an image of Ukrainians¹²¹.

- ¹²⁰ Yes, We Are Russkies! And We Are Proud of It. Available at: <u>http://c-eho.info/znat-i-pomnit/item/2554-da-my-moskali-i-etim-gordimsya</u>
- ¹²¹ Below you may find the images from the web-sites of Russkaya Pravda [Russian Truth], Zaria Novorossii [Dawn of New Russia] and other newspapers.
- ¹²² Molotov cocktails were used by the Euromaidan protesters in the clashes with security forces during the revolution in Kyiv in winter 2013-2014.
- ¹²³ The activists used these objects to protect themselves from the attacks of security forces during the revolution in Kyiv in winter 2013-2014.



The cartoon depicting Ukrainians as Nazis. A tire and a stick are additional attributes¹²³ referring to Euromaidan



The cartoon depicting a fascist swastika over the dome of Ukrainian Parliament – Verkhovna Rada



The cartoon depicting Euromaidan protesters as evil spirits. The devil wears a Ukrainian-flag-coloured coat with a burning tire, a Molotov cocktail and a bat before him. Beside him – the characters representing the European Court and the USA holding angel's wings and a halo over Ukraine



The cartoon depicting a Ukrainian in the humiliating and insulting context: with a piece of salo [cured slabs of fatback or pork belly] in his mouth and a bottle of vodka in his pocket. There is a chain with coat of arms of Ukraine on his neck and a rifle behind his back. The slogan above says 'Ukraine Is Europe'

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

In connection with the armed occupation of Crimea and the beginning of the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, there has been a splash of hate speech use in the media landscape of Crimea, mostly against the citizens of Ukraine. Amid the fast-paced events, the mass media of the Russian Federation and Crimea were making covert attempts to legalize the peninsula's occupation process and the armed conflict in Donbass in people's minds. At the same time, Ukrainian channels were blocked in the territory of Crimea, and local journalists and editorial offices critically highlighting the occupation of Crimea were subjected to numerous attacks and various types of obstruction of their activity, which eventually forced them to leave Crimea and move to mainland Ukraine.

The problem of hate speech use in the media landscape of Crimea had existed long before the occupation of the peninsula by Russia. However, since the very first days of invasion, the propaganda has started using hate speech on an unprecedented scale accompanied by the ever aggressive hostile rhetoric.

During this period, hate speech continued to be applied to the supporters and participants of Euromaidan as a separate group of people advocating the European integration and taking part in protests all over Ukraine in winter 2013-2014. The Russian propaganda mentioned these people most of the time in relation to different crimes. The Euromaidan supporters and Ukrainians in general were called fascists, neo-Nazis, junta's accomplices, Nazis' henchmen, Banderites, punishers etc. Speculations on the historical memory and tragedy of the Second World War intensified the effect and aggravated the international strife between Ukrainians and Russians, stirred up hatred between the participants of the armed conflict in Donbass, as well as escalated the atmosphere of discord between the residents of Crimea and people living in mainland Ukraine.

On the whole, hate speech in the media landscape of Crimea shows itself in different ways. In addition to a constant use of clichés inciting hatred in various mass media, such expressions are published on the official websites of the Crimean occupation authorities.

The monitoring of hate speech in the media landscape of Crimea was carried out using examples of three main sources: (1) on the air of top-rated television channels of the Russian Federation broadcasting in Crimea, (2) on the web-sites of the main occupation authorities of Crimea and (3) on the web-sites of the most popular Crimean mass media who got the opportunity to work in Crimea legally and whose editorial offices are located on the peninsula.

In particular, the monitoring group studied the content of the web-sites of the following occupation authorities: the 'Government of the Republic of Crimea,' 'State Council of the Republic of Crimea,' 'Government of Sevastopol,' 'Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol,' 'Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Crimea,' 'Prosecutor's Office of Sevastopol,' 'Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea' and the 'Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Sevastopol.' Furthermore, we also analyzed the materials on the web-sites of the Crimean mass media, including local TV channels (First Crimean, NTS Sevastopol), newspapers (Krymskaya Pravda, Slava Sevastopolia, Krymskiye Izvestia) and online media (Crimeainform, RIA Crimea, ForPost Sevastopol). We also monitored the newscasts and information and analytical programs aired at night (prime time) on three top-rated Russian TV channels broadcasting on the Crimean peninsula (Russia-1, NTV and Channel One).

The monitoring covers two periods: spring — autumn 2014 and the first half of 2017.

We have registered a total of 718 examples of incitement to hate, predominantly in the soft form, on the studied resources. Medium hate speech was used in 8% of cases. Harsh hate speech constitutes less than 1% of the overall number of examples.

The study established several ethnic, religious and social groups that hatred was incited towards in the media landscape of Crimea. These are Ukrainians (as an ethnos and/or civic community), Crimean Tatars, members and supporters of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Euromaidan activists, Muslims and migrants. Most of the time the mass media stirred up hatred towards the national/ethnic groups and those living in certain territories. Overall, there are 36 such groups. Ukrainians (as an ethnos and/or civic community) living in the government-controlled territories were the main object of hate speech among these groups.

The studied web-sites of the Crimean 'authorities' used hate speech mainly with respect to the groups based on their citizenship or residence in a certain territory, as well as migrants, Euromaidan supporters, LGBT community, members and supporters of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People.

Overall, we found 71 examples of incitement to hatred on the web-sites of the occupation authorities of Crimea. The soft form of hate speech was used in 58 cases, medium form — in 12 and harsh one — in one. The largest number of the examples of incitement to hatred was registered on the web-site of the 'Government of the Republic of Crimea.'

Within the monitoring period, the evening newscasts of the TV channels broadcasting in Crimea (Russia-1, NTV and Channel One) used hate speech at least 479 times: 1 example of harsh hate speech, 46 examples of medium hate speech and 432 of soft one.

During the monitoring period, the Russian news programs stirred up hatred mainly towards the national and ethnic groups and groups united by citizenship (324 examples), which is 68% of the total number. Hate speech was applied to 36 such groups. Hate speech with regard to religious groups was used 35 times, and 120 times — regarding different social groups.

The largest number of examples of incitement to hatred in the newscasts of three Russian TV channels broadcasting in Crimea concerned Ukrainians (based on citizenship and/or ethnic origin) — 184 cases or 43% of the overall number.

For instance, in 2014, Russian propaganda often called Ukrainians **Banderites**. Moreover, news anchors occasionally mentioned the crimes committed by Stepan Bandera, a Ukrainian political actor, ideologist and theorist of Ukrainian nationalism, during World War II. Everybody who fought on Bandera's side during the war were also called **Banderites** and, at the same time, **fascists** and **punishers**. This way, the citizens of modern Ukraine are made equal with these images in the public perception.

Crimeans are called **Russians**, and Donbass residents — a **separate nation** which reportedly demands its right to self-determination, although there is no separate nation in this territory, and the population mostly consists of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians.

Hence, the Russian TV channels help incite hatred towards Ukrainians not only in the consciousness of Russians who are their main target audience, but also among the citizens of the separate territories of Ukraine which are covered by the broadcasting of these mass media.

While monitoring the web-sites of the Crimean mass media, we revealed 168 examples of hate speech with the majority of them on the Sevastopol web-site ForPost (51 examples) which belongs to Kazhanov Sergey, a deputy of the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol, and that of Crimeainform (34 examples) owned by Maksim Nikolayenko who ran as a candidate for the head of the occupation administration of Simferopol in September 2017.

The groups of people who share ethnicity, nationality and/or citizenship (130 examples) and social groups (26 examples) were subjected to hate speech most of the time. Ukrainians as an ethnic and/or civic community were the major objects of verbal attacks (123 examples).

Hate speech was used in the form of quotations of different politicians, public activists and experts. But in a number of cases, the journalists of the studied publications were the ones to stir up hatred.

Besides Ukrainians in general, the main objects of hate speech were also the following groups: the members and supporters of the Mejlis Tatar People (12 examples), Crimean Tatars (7 examples) and Muslims (5 examples). These examples constitute 14% of the total number. Taking into account the fact that almost all supporters of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Crimea are the representatives of the indigenous community, we may say that all these manifestations of hatred are aimed mostly at Crimean Tatars.

Crimean Tatars are mainly depicted as radical Islamists and extremists, and their representative body — the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People — as a terrorist and extremist organization.

Given the tendencies revealed during the study, we may assume that the Crimean mass media fulfill their common task of forming an image of an enemy of Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatar people which in its overwhelming majority did not recognize the occupation of the Crimean peninsula.

The intensity of hate speech use in the media landscape of Crimea started gradually fading away as time passed. At the same time, hate speech is still rather common: it is used by the representatives of Crimean 'authorities,' politicians, local journalists and pro-Russian activists. Hate rhetoric peaks during high-profile events mostly related to the armed conflict in Donbass as well as the activities of the Crimean Tatar national movement.

At the same time, the degree of controlled hatred towards Ukrainians in the media landscape of Crimea and the Russian Federation in 2017 became significantly lower as compared with 2014. The fighting in Donbass also got less intense in 2017 (as compared with 2014-2015). The main objects of hate speech in this period differ from those established in the first period of monitoring.

During all this time, the Russian and Crimean information landscape continues legalizing the occupation and justifying the prosecution of Crimeans for not agreeing with the Russian aggression. In 2017, the Crimean and Russian mass media focused a lot on the threat of terrorism, highlighting the military actions in Syria against the militants of the ISIL and other terrorist groups in the Middle East. In the newscasts and other programs, these threats are constantly projected on the situation in the Russian Federation and Crimea. In addition to Ukrainians, the main objects of hate speech in 2017 were the residents of the Central Asia and migrants.

Keeping high anxiety and hatred levels in Crimea through the mass media, Russia forms the platform for creating, if necessary, a controlled civil conflict. Moreover, hate speech was used to form in the occupied territory the public support of the Russian policy as regards Ukraine and all dissidents in Crimea.

A mass use of hate speech in the media landscape of Crimea is a grave violation of national and international laws and journalistic standards.

At the same time, Russian hate speech laws are actively applied to the citizens of Ukraine in Crimea as well as with a view to pressure public activists. Incitement of hatred towards Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and Muslims inside Crimea leads to a destabilized situation and creates the environment for hatred-based crimes¹²⁴.

Controlled hatred is used to legalize in the public perception the repressions of activists and those discontented with the authorities' actions. The effect of hatred-inciting publications is multiplied by the stiff restrictions of the free speech on the peninsula¹²⁵. A total clean-up of alternative points of view in the media landscape of Crimea and the Russian Federation enables the mass media to enhance its impact on the society by stirring up hatred towards the ethnic, religious and social groups who do not trust the occupation authorities.

Frequent use of hate speech on the air of TV channels and on web-sites partially or fully owned by the representatives of the occupation government is the evidence of direct interest of the Russian Federation in such actions. Such an interest is also manifested by the fact that the mass media quote in their publications people's deputies, politicians, various officials and the President of the Russian Federation¹²⁶.

At the same time, mass media, state-owned as well, cite xenophobic statements without any commentary condemning such actions. Hate speech is used even in laws and regulations, texts with hate speech are constantly posted on the official web-sites of the occupation authorities of the peninsula. As the monitoring demonstrated, in all these cases Ukrainians are the main objects of hate mongering based on both their citizenship and ethnic origin.

Taking into consideration the fact that the Russian Federation is engaged in an armed conflict with Ukraine, we may conclude that all the abovementioned examples of incitement to hatred towards Ukrainians with the use of state resources represent one of the tools of warfare. The study showed that hatred in the Russian mass media towards Ukrainians is imposed on a large scale not only in the territory of occupied Crimea, but across Russia as well. This information may be proven by the recent studies conducted by the Yuri Levada Analytical Center. Opinion polls published by this Center confirm that the attitude of Russians towards Ukrainians became much worse since the beginning of the armed conflict¹²⁷. In December 2017, 29% of those polled called Ukraine the enemy of Russia, while there were zero such answers in October 2012128.

¹²⁴ Publication: A Crimean Has Been Savagely Beat up in Crimea for Wearing Ukrainian Symbols – <u>http://crimeahrg.org/kryimchanina-</u> zhestoko-izbili-v-kryimu-za-ukrainskuyu-simvoliku/

¹²⁵ Crimea Beyond Rules, Issue No. 4. Thematic review of the human rights situation under occupation. — Issue No. 4 — Informational Occupation. Available at: <u>https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/4Kr_Ru_fin_18.12.2017.pdf</u>

¹²⁶ Publication: They Have Chosen Two Jews and One Ukrainian: Putin Told Us About His Friends Who Were Put under Sanctions — <u>http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/984616/</u>

¹²⁷ Publication: Attitude towards Countries. Yuri Levada Analytical Center, February 12, 2018 <u>https://www.levada.ru/2018/02/12/ot-noshenie-k-stranam/</u>

¹²⁸ Publication: Russia's Enemies. Yuri Levada Analytical Center, January 10, 2018 <u>https://www.levada.ru/2018/01/10/vragi-rossii/</u>

Such actions amid the armed conflict constitute a threat to the citizens of Ukraine who are always the objects of hate speech on the part of the aggressor.

Recommendations

Hate speech in the media landscape of Crimea, in our opinion, directly impacts the degree of aggression in the society. We may say that one of the consequences of hate speech being common in Crimea is the attacks at Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars as well as vandalism of the objects of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar national and Muslim religious infrastructure.

Ukrainian society, just like the Ukrainian government, practically cannot influence the developments in occupied Crimea. Nevertheless, we cannot afford ourselves to steer clear from the situation, especially in the areas with serious violations.

We recommend the legitimate bodies of the Prosecutor's Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to consider the sharpest statements to see if there are any elements of the crimes referred to in Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Initiating criminal proceedings in connection with the most outrageous cases may be a clear signal from the Ukrainian government that incitement of hatred by mass media and de-facto authorities of the occupied peninsula is not only frowned upon, but legally prosecuted as well.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine may take into account the hate speech situation in the media landscape of Crimea to enhance the international pressure on Russia as an occupant.

In particular, we think that the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination should take into the consideration the situation in the media landscape of Crimea when analyzing the observance by Russia of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The fact that hate speech is systematically used on the air of Russian TV channels broadcasting in Crimea and in the mass media controlled by the occupation authorities, officially as well, just like a large-scale use of hate speech by the representatives of the de-facto Crimean authorities, may serve as an argument in the proceedings on the merits as part of the case 'Ukraine vs. Russia' in the International Court of Justice as regards Russia's violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

Given the dangerous consequences, we call on the field-specific international organizations, such as the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (ODIHR OSCE), to treat the problem of hate speech dissemination through the mass media on the occupied peninsula with the utmost seriousness.

We demand that the government of the Russian Federation and occupation authorities in Crimea stop using hate speech, including oral and written statements or speeches, publications on web-sites or other resources of the occupation authorities in Crimea, as well as take all the necessary measures to prevent hatred and discrimination-driven crimes which may come as a result of hate speech use with regard to the mentioned vulnerable groups.

The individuals guilty of inciting to hatred, calling for discrimination and encouraging violence with the help of administrative, financial and other resources of the Russian and occupation authorities must be held accountable and punished accordingly.

As an occupant, Russia must observe in Crimea the norms of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and comply with the obligation to protect the civilian population from any acts of violence or intimidation and insults that are often present in hate speech; and not allow discrimination of civil population in Crimea based on race, religion or political convictions.

In addition, we request the journalistic community of the Russian Federation to critically consider the incitement of hatred in the Russian mass media in the context of the armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea.

HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA: An Information and Analytical Report on the Spread of Hate Speech on the Territory of the Crimean Peninsula (March 2014 – July 2017)

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